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‘Dream as if you’ll live forever. Live as if you’ll die today.’ – Unknown
One of the things that you learn whilst pursuing a Ph.D. is writing. Harry 
Barkema taught me how to position, how to frame, and how to clearly 
explicate causal mechanisms. Furthermore, I learned a crucial lesson from 
Professor Strunk (2000) who used to impress upon his students to avoid 
writing too lengthy texts, barking to them from his lecturer stand: ‘Omit 
needless words!’ followed by a deafening silence. I hope that this dissertation 
is proof that I have learned something from these men.
Now, let me answer three essential questions: Why did I pursue a Ph.D.?   
What was the process like? What did I learn?
Why did I pursue a Ph.D.?
On April 3rd, 1936, Arnoud C. de Vet, my grandfather and intellectual role 
model, defended his dissertation ‘On the diagnostics of the meningioma 
cerebri’. He went on to become one of the most celebrated neurosurgeons in 
the Netherlands, as a physician and as a researcher (he published 62 academic 
papers). In the 1980s and 1990s, ‘Bonpapa’ tried to impress upon me, the 
young man that I was, the importance of pursuing a Ph.D. To his regret, 
he failed. I was certain that a Ph.D. would have no value for my career as a 
businessman and management consultant, and hence surely I did not want 
to waste precious time on writing a dissertation. He did however plant the 
seed in my mind. 
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Emilie. Her adventurous birth made me reconsider the fundamental decisions 
in life. In the spirit of the quote at the start of this preface, I left McKinsey, 
in search of intellectual depth and a balanced lifestyle. I found both in 
the  academic  world.  Let  me  thank  Laurens  Sloot  and  Professor  Harry 
Commandeur and also Professor Peter Leeflang for helping me navigate 
this terra incognita. The route led to Professor Harry Barkema at Tilburg 
University, who removed multiple obstacles including a budget freeze to 
pave the way for my recruitment. 
What was the process like?
It was hard work. The two-year course-load was challenging and therefore 
enjoyable. The theoretical courses stimulated me to strengthen my logical 
thinking (e.g. regarding causality) and the empirical courses provided a level of 
methodological rigor and statistical tools that are many steps more advanced 
than anything I had previously used as a management consultant. For my 
formal  training,  I  especially  thank  Professor  Jean-Francois  Hennart  and 
Professor Xavier Martin (inspiring examples of razor-blade sharp thinking), 
and Professor Tammo Bijmolt (a wonderful guide in the world of advanced 
multivariate statistics).
One of the most satisfying aspects of pursuing a Ph.D. is the opportunity to 
teach the next generation. For two years, I helped bachelor students learn 
about organizational behavior, i.e. about what individuals and groups can 
do to affect organizational performance. The course developed together with 
Mario Schijven focused on rigorously tested but surprising, counterintuitive, 
insights from the academic management literature that are relatively easy 
to put into practice. Investing time in developing a surprising course is a 
Dissertation_rotis Serif_SW.indd6   6 07.08.2007   9:43:35 Uhrworthwhile and highly satisfying pursuit, even if only for the enthusiastic 
reactions by the students.
What did I learn?
So, were these four academic years fully worth it? The answer is a resounding 
yes: I have learnt tremendously. I have been able to develop a much deeper 
understanding of strategic and organizational issues, particularly in the area 
of innovation and groups, and especially where based on social and cognitive 
psychology. In addition, I have acquired theoretical concepts and empirical 
tools that allow sharper thought processes. This is clearly helpful in my current 
occupation as an independent management consultant. Many consultants 
do not properly understand and use such concepts and tools, such as e.g. 
moderation and mediation, hierarchical regression modeling, endogeneity, 
structural equation modeling, and advanced statistical significance testing. 
Working as an independent consultant whilst finalizing this dissertation,   
I have already been able to save clients a considerable amount of money 
using the tools I acquired as a Ph.D. candidate. 
Let me thank my wife Brigitte for being a great intellectual and emotional 
support during these years. My papers have improved because of her, and 
so has my life. She knows that I love her. A thank you to my parents Trees 
and Ben, for having stimulated my development from 1972 onwards, for 
always supporting my choices in life and for spending many weeks with the 
kids, so that I could be in Tilburg to do research and to teach. A big kiss and 
hug to the three small wonders in my life: Emilie for allowing me to be the 
most important man in her life (for the moment) and for getting her father 
a Ph.D., Alexander for being so adventurous and open to new experiences, 
and Marie for having such a positive and peaceful outlook on life and for 
always, always smiling.
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION
It is generally acknowledged that in order to sustain and enhance performance, 
firms  need  innovation.  Innovation  is  here  defined  as  the  ‘intentional 
introduction and application within a job, work team or organization of ideas, 
processes, products or procedures which are new to that job, work team or 
organization and which are designed to benefit the job, the work team or the 
organization’ (West & Farr, 1990).  Innovation allows companies to grow, to 
win in the competitive race, and to make high profits, and it allows societies 
composed of innovating companies to enjoy high employment levels, high 
wages, and high standards of living.
There is a substantial amount of research on innovation: in the year 2006 alone 
there were 1777 papers with innovation as topic listed in the Web of Science 
Social Sciences Citation Index. Most of this research attempts to identify the 
factors that lead to innovation. First, of all there is a lot of research at the 
firm level of analysis, e.g. regarding patterns in R&D expenditures (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990; Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005), threats of innovation to 
incumbents (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003), exploration 
vs. exploitation (March, 1991; McGrath, 2001; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), 
market  orientation  (Atuahene-Gima,  2005;  Christensen  &  Bower,  1996; 
Faems, Van Looy, & Debackere, 2005; Narver, 2004), and alliances of a firm 
(Ahuja, 2000; Oxley & Sampson, 2004).
However, not only the firm level of analysis can shed light on factors that 
affect firm innovation. Innovation by firms is a product of individuals and 
teams working together. Innovation is essentially a product of useful new 
ideas. Such ideas are first generated by an individual or a team and are then 
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adopted and institutionalized by the firm (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999).   
Innovation performance by a firm is hence clearly dependent on generation 
of useful novel ideas (creativity) and the selection of useful novel ideas 
(decision-making) by individuals and teams. This dissertation focuses on 
exactly that: the generation and selection of useful novel ideas by individuals 
and teams. 
In terms of the factors that affect creativity and decision-making in the 
context of innovation, I focus on thinking in silence, as opposed to thinking 
aloud at the individual level of analysis, and as opposed to group debate at 
the group level of analysis.
There is a number of streams of literature on the effects of thinking in silence 
on individual cognitive performance (see chapters 2, 3, and 4 for reviews). 
Some streams suggest these effects are positive (e.g. verbal overshadowing, 
production blocking), some suggest these are negative (e.g. verbal activation). 
The literature on the effects of thinking in silence on innovation is filled with 
important gaps which I define precisely and address in chapters 2- 4. 
Our research objective in chapter 2 is to study, at the individual level of 
analysis,  under  what  conditions  thinking  in  silence  actually  hinders   
creativity,  and  under  what  conditions  it  does  not.  We  combine  social 
psychological  and  cognitive  psychological  lenses  to  study  the  effect  of 
an interaction of two self-monitoring variables on creativity. We test our   
theory  in  a  university  laboratory  setting  with  two  large  randomized   
experiments,  using  standard  procedures  and  measures.  This  paper  is   
co-authored  with  Prof.  Dr.  Carsten  K.W.  de  Dreu  and  in  press  in  the   
European Journal of Social Psychology (A ‘high impact journal’ according to 
the Social Science Citation Index Impact Score 1.6 (2005), which is similar to 
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the scores of e.g. Journal of Product Innovation Management and Journal 
of Management).
In  chapter  3,  I  take  the  study  of  the  effect  of  thinking  in  silence  on 
creativity to the group level of analysis, and focus on the effect thinking in 
silence versus group debate on creativity (which is an important input for 
innovation). Scholars writing in the management literature typically assume 
that group debate can have positive effects on innovation, and they study 
under what circumstances the effect of group debate is most positive. For 
example, Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999) find that debate characterized 
by defending viewpoints and challenging those of others allows teams to 
capture the benefits of diversity. Postmes, Spears and Cihangir  (2001) find 
that critical debate, rather than debate focused on consensus, positively 
affects information sharing, a key factor influencing group performance. 
Jehn and Mannix (2001) find that debate characterized by moderate task 
conflict at the midpoint of group interaction positively influences group 
performance. Barkema and Chyrkov claim that constructive debate mediates 
the effect of top management team diversity on strategic innovation, such as 
technological and bureaucratic innovation, entry into new product markets, 
and  so  on  (Barkema  &  Chvyrkov,  2007).  The  underlying  assumption  in 
the cited and other management literature is that group debate is more 
effective for innovation than individuals thinking alone. This dissertation 
challenges that belief: the research objective of chapter 3 is to study in 
which conditions suspending group debate (temporarily) can be productive 
for creativity. I use a social (cognitive) psychology lens, combining it with 
personality psychology, to theorize that when at least one group member 
has relatively low extraversion, suspending group debate temporarily (in the 
form of an intermezzo for thinking alone), may increase group creativity. The 
randomized experiment (using relatively standard procedures and standard 
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measures) with pre-existing student teams working on developing solutions 
for a real problem on campus supported my predictions. This paper benefited 
from the frequent discussions with my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Harry Barkema.
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the effect of thinking in silence on idea generation 
(creativity) at respectively the individual and group level of analysis. In chapter 
4, I shift the focus from the generation of ideas to the selection of ideas, at 
the group level of analysis. The research objective in this chapter is to study 
the effect of group debate on the strategic decision to adopt an incremental 
innovation or rather a more radical innovation for market implementation. 
Such decisions are usually strategic in nature for a firm, given that strategic 
decisions  are  those  that  are  “important,  in  terms  of  the  actions  taken, 
the resources committed, or the precedents set“ (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, 
& Theoret, 1976). Although group debate and strategic decision-making 
have both been extensively studied in the literature, there has been a lack 
of research on the effect of group debate on strategic decision-making in 
the context of innovation, as far as my colleagues in the management and 
psychological disciplines and I can tell. In chapter 4, I combine disconnected 
streams of cognitive psychology literature on the impact of verbalization with 
social psychology literature on self-monitoring, and theorize that depending 
on specific team characteristics group debate may increase the likelihood of 
adopting a radical innovation or decrease it. This theory was supported by a 
randomized experiment (using relatively standard procedures and standard 
measures)  with  pre-existing  student  teams.  Both  theory  and  experiment 
were supported by frequent discussions with my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Harry   
G. Barkema.
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The focus of this dissertation and the focus of each substantive chapter is 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE INFLUENCE OF ARTICULATION, SELF-MONITORING AbILITY,  
AND SENSITIVITY TO OTHERS ON CREATIVITY
By Arnoud J. De Vet and Carsten K.W. De Dreu
In Press in European Journal of Social Psychology.
Abstract
Although it is often recommended to think aloud to solve problems and to 
become more creative, cognitive and social psychological research suggests 
thinking aloud may actually produce less creative ideas than thinking in 
silence. The results of two experiments indeed showed that thinking aloud 
hinders creativity – although people produced the same amount of new uses 
for an object, these were judged to be less original in the thinking aloud 
condition. Experiment 2 further showed that this effect was particularly 
pronounced for individuals with high sensitivity to what other’s think of them 
and low ability to adapt to these expectations. From this we conclude that the 
felt presence of an actual or implied audience when thinking aloud reduces 
creative idea generation especially among those having difficulty adapting to 
others. Implications for creativity research and for the promotion of creativity 
in applied settings, such as in organizational teams, are discussed.
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2.1. INTRODUCTION
In many social settings creativity is valued and sought after. Creative thought 
helps people to learn and develop, to solve problems, and to settle their 
conflicts. Social psychologists indeed have a longstanding interest in the 
interplay between creative thought and group processes. Numerous studies 
on  brainstorming  compared  groups  with  individuals  brainstorming  alone 
(e.g. Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Nijstad & Paulus, 2003a), or the impact of 
different viewpoints on creative group processes and team innovation (e.g. 
De Dreu & West, 2001; Nemeth, Personnaz, Personnaz, & Goncalo, 2004). 
Most of this work has considered creative idea generation when members 
of the group express their thought aloud, so that others can hear them 
and  perhaps  benefit.  Thinking  aloud  as  an  elicitation  method  resonates 
with the intuitive notion that when talking about one’s problem often the 
solution presents itself. It also resonates with common practice in many 
applied settings, such as organizational teams, where it is recommended that 
articulating tacit ideas leads to social sharing, which in turn is supposed to 
foster creativity and work place innovation (e.g. Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
It finally resonates with some work in cognitive psychology, which we review 
below. However, there is good reason to believe that thinking aloud hinders 
rather than helps creative thought, and we review this work as well. We 
present two experiments in which we tested whether and when thinking 
aloud helps or hinders creative idea generation. 
2.1.1. Does thinking aloud help or hinder creative ideation?
The idea that thinking aloud promotes ideation may be inferred from memory 
theories. Research has shown that thinking aloud enhances the capacity 
of working memory (Baddeley, 1999). For instance, participants repeating   
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out loud a phone number remember longer numbers than those repeating it 
silently. Likewise, Chi and colleagues (Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994) 
found that participants who thought aloud about what they had previously 
read remembered more of it than participants who silently thought about 
the same passage. In other words, thinking aloud may enhance memory and 
thus the knowledge available. 
Although  enhanced  memory  is  certainly  no  guarantee  for  more  creative 
performance (Amabile, 1996; Simonton, 2000), the literature on language 
and  thought  suggests  that  articulation  can  have  a  positive  effect  on   
creativity (e.g. De Saussure, 1915/1983; Luria, 1982; O’Grady, Archibald,   
Aronoff,  &  Rees-Miller,  2001;  Slobin,  2000;  Steinberg,  Nagata,  &  Aline, 
2001;  Vygotsky,  1934/1986).  People  use  a  mental  lexicon  when  they   
produce  speech  and  using  a  word  activates  other  words  and  their   
meanings. This mental lexicon contains word forms, their related sounds,   
and concepts that convey their meaning (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002),   
and through automatic spreading activation in the mental lexicon other   
words  and  their  meanings  are  activated.  Because  individuals  use  more   
words when they think aloud than when they think in silence (Duncan &   
Cheyne,  1999;  Holodynski,  2004),  it  may  well  be  that  more  constructs   
are  activated  when  thinking  aloud  than  when  thinking  in  silence   
(cf.  Vygotsky,  1934/1986).  As  a  result,  thinking  aloud  may  stimulate 
creativity. 
Evidence for the idea that thinking aloud may enhance creative performance 
is provided by Wetzstein and Hacker (2004). In their experiment, the impact 
of question-based reflective verbalization on the quality of design solutions 
was investigated. After participants had designed an object, they were asked 
to verbally describe their design (or not, in a control condition), and then 
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continued their design. Results showed that the design quality improved 
substantially, that the experimental group invented new principles and added 
novel functions to their design. 
Because  thinking  aloud  may  activate  more  constructs  than  thinking  in 
silence, and because thinking aloud enhances working memory capacity, 
thinking  aloud  may  increase  creative  idea  generation.  However,  there  is 
good reason to believe thinking aloud may actually hinder creative thought. 
First, speech production – looking up word forms in the mental lexicon and 
structuring them into a sentence, looking up sounds in the mental lexicon, 
and actually articulating – requires cognitive processing (e.g., Levelt, 1989). 
Thinking aloud may thus lower the processing capacity available for creative 
performance. 
Several  studies  speak  to  the  possibility  that  thinking  aloud  undermines 
creativity.  A  study  by  Schooler,  Ohlsson  and  Brooks  (1993)  showed  that 
“verbalization can result in the disruption of non-reportable processes that 
are critical to achieving insight solutions” (p. 166). These authors show that 
verbalization of nonverbal tasks can interfere with successful performance. 
They report four experiments to determine the effect of various forms of 
articulation (e.g. retrospective verbalization of the problem solving strategies 
after an interruption, concurrent verbalization during problem solving) on 
solving insight problems and non-insight problems. Results showed negative 
effects of verbalization on insight problems, and no effect on non-insight 
problems. 
Work by Kim (2002) qualifies this notion. She found that talking aloud has a 
negative influence on solving reasoning problems for participants from East 
Asia. For participants with a European background, however, talking aloud 
Dissertation_rotis Serif_SW.indd10   10 07.08.2007   9:43:37 Uhr11
had no significant effect on reasoning performance. The explanation offered 
relies on the idea that people from East Asia tend to think in a nonverbal 
way, and that for them “the thinking-aloud task should impair performance, 
because the person would need to work on an extra task of converting his or 
her thoughts into words on top of the main problem-solving task” (p. 835). 
Participants with a European background, however, think more verbally and 
for them “the task of thinking aloud should not affect the performance on 
problem solving very much, because his or her thoughts are ready to be 
vocalized as words” (p. 835). 
For two reasons, we cannot be certain that thinking aloud reduces creative 
performance. First, because the Schooler et al. (1993) study was conducted 
with participants with a European background, the results by Kim (2002) 
cast some doubt on the generality of the notion that thinking aloud reduces 
problem solving and reasoning performance. Second, the tasks used in the 
work by Schooler et al. (1993) and Kim (2002) are only indirectly related to 
creativity. Creative performance can be decomposed into fluency (generating 
many ideas), flexibility (using different cognitive categories to sample ideas 
from), and originality (generating new and unusual ideas and perspectives). 
Whereas  solving  insight  problems  may  require  cognitive  flexibility  and 
divergent thinking, it not necessarily requires fluency and originality. Prior work 
on articulation thus hints at the possibility that thinking-aloud undermines 
creative performance, but cannot answer the question whether articulation 
indeed reduces cognitive fluency and/or originality. In fact, work by Fleck 
and Weisberg (2004) suggests that effects of articulation do not transfer to 
creative performance. These authors found no effects of the Schooler et al 
verbalization procedures on creative problem solving (i.e., Duncker’s candle 
problem). 
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Taken  together,  from  the  above  works  it  remains  unclear  whether  the 
putatively  negative  effects  of  thinking  aloud  transfer  comfortably  to 
creative performance. However, and albeit for quite different reasons, social 
psychological theory also suggests that thinking aloud hinders creativity. 
Articulation  brings  an  individual’s  thoughts  out  in  the  open  for  all  to 
scrutinize, which brings about a feeling of being observed. Feeling observed 
promotes  self-evaluation  (James  &  Olson,  2000;  Plant  &  Ryan,  1985) 
and self-evaluation has a well-documented negative effect on creativity 
(Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968; Plant et al., 1985; Silvia & Phillips, 
2004; Szymanski & Harkins, 1992). For example, a study on brainstorming 
by  Camacho  and  Paulus  (1995)  showed  that  individuals  high  in  social 
anxiousness  generated  less  original  ideas  when  brainstorming  in  groups 
rather than alone. This resonates with work on electronic brainstorming 
showing that individuals generate fewer original ideas when they can be 
identified, compared to when they cannot (Connolly, Jessup, & Valacich, 
1990). It also resonates with the classical finding that brainstorming groups, 
in which members express ideas verbally, are less fluent and less original 
than individuals brainstorming alone (Bond & Van Leeuwen, 1991; Diehl & 
Stroebe, 1991; McGrath, 1984; Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991) 
Productivity loss in brainstorming groups has been attributed to production 
blocking – group members need to wait for others to finish expressing their 
ideas, and this undermines the formation of new ideas (Diehl et al., 1987; 
Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2003b; Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). Interestingly, 
however, in some studies group members expressed their ideas verbally while 
in other studies ideas were written down. Mullen et al. (1991) reported 
meta-analytic evidence that productivity loss was greater when ideas were 
expressed verbally, supporting the idea that thinking aloud undermines 
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creative performance, at the least when people are working in groups and 
can observe each other. 
2.1.2. Overview of the present study
The  literature  reviewed  above  suggests  two  contrasting  predictions: 
(1) thinking aloud leads to more creative ideas than thinking in silence,   
versus  (2)  thinking  aloud  leads  to  less  creative  ideas  than  thinking  in 
silence. For both predictions some indirect evidence was reviewed. The first 
prediction is theoretically grounded in cognitive and language psychology 
and is consistent with work on object design (Wetzstein & Hacker, 2004). 
The alternative prediction is consistent with some verbal overshadowing work 
on insight problems (Schooler et al., 1993; but see Kim, 2002), and work on 
group brainstorming (e.g., Mullen et al., 1991). , Although the evidence for 
this second prediction is solid, we stress that verbal overshadowing does 
not seem to transfer comfortably from insight tasks to creative performance 
(Fleck & Weisberg, 2004), and that in group brainstorming there necessarily 
is a social context that may elicit social anxiety (Camacho & Paulus, 1995). 
To really settle the debate on the effects of thinking aloud, we thus need 
new data. In Experiment 1 we compared the number of original uses for 
a tin can mentioned by participants in a thinking aloud and a thinking in 
silence condition. This experiment thus simply discriminates between the two 
perspectives outlined above. Experiment 2, employing a similar methodology, 
was designed to further explore the boundary conditions of the results of 
Experiment 1. 
In both experiments we employed the unusual-uses test, which is commonly 
used  in  creativity  research  (e.g.,  Csikszentmihalyi,  1975;  Eisenberger  & 
Armeli, 1997; Guilford, 1967; Silvia et al., 2004; Szymanski et al., 1992;   
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Torrance, 1962). The task allows one to assess creativity on a specific task   
and has been demonstrated to be sensitive to experimental manipulation 
(e.g., Hocevar & Bachelor, 1989). To manipulate articulation, we used a typical 
think-aloud procedure (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Kim, 2002). Participants in 
the think-aloud condition were asked to give a concurrent verbal report, i.e. 
to verbalize cognitive processes directly rather than after the fact. Those in 
the thinking-in-silence condition were, in contrast, explicitly instructed to 
remain silent while thinking about new uses for a tin can.
2.2. ExPERIMENT 1
2.2.1. Method
Participants  and  experimental  design.  Forty  five  senior  economics 
students at the Erasmus University Rotterdam participated for course credit. 
Participants were randomly allocated to a thinking-aloud or a thinking-in-
silence condition. Dependent measures were the number of ideas generated, 
and their originality.
Procedure. The study took place in large lecture halls with over 500 seats. 
As students entered the lecture hall they were randomly assigned to a seat. 
Because of the size of the lecture halls participants were always seated far 
apart. Each seat contained a set of earplugs and a headset for participants 
to use. The experimenter introduced the study by telling the students they 
were about to participate in a study about thinking strategies. He then 
asked participants to put in the earplugs and to put on the headsets so that 
thinking aloud would not distract other participants. In the thinking-in-
silence condition the same procedure was followed.
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The  experimenter  handed  out  booklets  and  asked  participants  to  start 
working at his sign (to ensure that all participants would spend the same 
amount of time on the task). The booklets instructed participants to think of 
unusual uses for a tin can, one of the Torrance Tests for Creative Thinking 
(Torrance, 1962). Half of the participants were instructed to do so silently; 
the others were instructed to think aloud. After 5 minutes, participants were 
instructed to stop and to hand in their booklet.
Four students from the same population who had not participated in the 
experiment each evaluated the responses of all participants. Each judge used 
a different, randomized order, and was asked to count (1) the number of ideas 
and (2) the number of original ideas. Following Torrance (1962) and other 
studies using this task (e.g., Eisenberger & Armeli, 1997; Guilford, 1967; 
Silvia & Phillips, 2004; Szymanski & Harkins, 1992), ideas were considered 
original if they could not be placed in one of the following categories: 
using the tin can (a) to drink from; (b) as a building block; (c) to create a 
wire telephone; (d) as a house or boat; or (e) as a toy. Examples of ideas 
that were coded as original are to use a tin can “to draw a circle with”, “as 
a cutting tool”, “as wall decoration”, and “as a source of inspiration”. This 
classification of ideas as original versus unoriginal is based on extensive 
research using this task, and frequency counts of how often specific uses 
are given (e.g., Torrance, 1962). As such, the current classification of ideas 
as original versus not original reflects frequency of occurrence more than 
some subjective rating by independent coders. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that with this task we assessed two out of the three components 
of creative performance – fluency (the number of unique uses mentioned) 
and originality (frequency-based classification, see above) but not cognitive 
flexibility (the number of distinct cognitive categories used to sample ideas 
and uses from). We refrained from developing a category system because 
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participants generated relatively few unusual uses and unlike brainstorming 
research  where  usually  many  more  ideas  are  generated  (and  substantial 
cognitive categories can be construed) we were unable to develop a set of 
meaningful categories. We return to this in the General Discussion.
2.2.2. Results and discussion
The reliability of the judges’ evaluations was high (Cronbach’s = 0.99 for the 
number of ideas, and = 0.92 for the number of original ideas). For further 
analysis of the number of ideas (fluency) and the number of original ideas 
(originality) the counts of the four judges were averaged. 
Consistent with research showing that quantity breeds quality, the correlation 
between fluency and originality was positive and significant, r (44) = .87,   
p < .001. 
Results are summarized in figure 2.1. Participants in the thinking aloud 
condition  produced  fewer  ideas  than  those  thinking  silently,  but  this 
difference was not significant, t (43) = 0.89, p < 0.38. Consistent with 
the idea that thinking aloud hinders creativity, participants in the thinking   
aloud condition produced less original ideas than those thinking silently. 
This difference was significant, t (43) = 2.13, p < .05. 




















Effects of articulation on fl  uency (number of unique ideas) and originality 
(number of original ideas); Experiment 1
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2.3. ExPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 showed that thinking aloud reduces the generation of original 
ideas. This finding is inconsistent with the idea that thinking aloud activates 
more constructs, or improves working memory and thereby enhances creativity. 
Results are, in contrast, consistent with the idea that thinking aloud requires 
processing in terms of translating thoughts into words and sentences (e.g., 
Kim, 2002; e.g., Levelt, 1989; Schooler et al., 1993). In addition to this, 
thinking aloud may lead to an attempt to adapt expression given that others 
can observe (hear) the thoughts expressed (James et al., 2000; Plant et al., 
1985; Szymanski et al., 1992). Even more, thinking aloud may enhance the 
mere feeling of being observed and stimulate the “spotlight effect” where 
one feels being observed and evaluated by others even though these others 
are not present and will not be able to evaluate (cf., Gilovich, Medvec, & 
Savitsky, 2000). Thus, Experiment 1 corroborates that thinking aloud reduces 
creativity, and this may be due to lowered processing capacity, to increased 
evaluation apprehension, or both. 
In Experiment 2 we examined the moderating role of individual differences 
in  evaluation  apprehension  on  the  effects  of  articulation  on  creative 
performance. As mentioned, thinking aloud may raise people’s awareness of 
others, and increases people’s need to adapt to the norms and values these 
others (presumably) endorse. Work on self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974; Snyder 
& Gangestad, 1986) has, however, shown that individuals chronically differ in 
both their sensitivity to what others think of them and in their ability to adapt 
to these expectations (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). Whereas some individuals 
are highly concerned with what others think of them, other individuals are 
less  concerned  with  other  people’s  evaluations.  Likewise,  whereas  some 
individuals have strong ability to adapt to other people’s expectations, other 
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individuals have greater difficulty adapting. These two components of self-
monitoring – sensitivity to others, and ability to adapt – are theoretically and 
empirically distinct, in that individuals can be very sensitive yet highly able to 
adapt, or very sensitive and quite unable to adapt (see e.g., Briggs, Cheek, & 
Buss, 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Miller & Thayer, 1989). 
If thinking aloud reduces creativity because it raises social pressures and 
concern with evaluation, thinking aloud should reduce creativity especially 
among those individuals high in sensitivity to what others think of them. Those 
individuals low in sensitivity should be less influenced by elicitation procedure 
(i.e., thinking aloud vs. thinking in silence) when generating creative ideas. 
Furthermore, the above work on self-monitoring suggests that sensitivity 
becomes an issue especially when individuals have low ability to adapt to 
others. When sensitivity is paired to low ability, social context absorbs more 
processing capacity than when sensitivity is paired to high ability. In other 
words, we predicted a three-way interaction among articulation, sensitivity, 
and ability: Compared to thinking in silence, thinking aloud reduces creative 
ideation when individuals are sensitive to others, especially when they have 
low rather than high ability to adapt to others.
Before moving on it is important to note that past work on elicitation method 
(thinking aloud versus thinking in silence) has not been related to work on 
self-monitoring, social anxiety, or related constructs – effects tend to be 
explained in cognitive rather than social-psychological terms and processes. 
Vice versa, research on group brainstorming has been concerned with social 
anxiety  and  self-monitoring  but  those  studies  did  not  vary  elicitation 
method. Put differently, the current experiments contribute to both areas of 
research, by articulating the effects of elicitation and by specifying the social 
psychological conditions moderating these elicitation method effects.
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2.3.1. Method
Participants and experimental design. One hundred and fifty three first-
year students at the University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment 
for course credits. Participants were randomly allocated to a think-aloud 
or  a  think-in-silence  condition  and  performed  the  same  creativity  task 
as in Experiment 1. Prior to the experiment, participants completed self-
monitoring scales tapping both self-monitoring ability and sensitivity to 
others.  Dependent  variables  were  the  number  of  unique  ideas,  and  the 
number of original ideas generated.
Procedure and independent variables. Students participated in groups of 
4 – 6 individuals. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated 
in individual cubicles. The experiment began with the assessment of self-
monitoring. To measure self-monitoring, we used the Lennox and Wolfe 
(1984)  13-item  Revised  Self-Monitoring  Scale.  The  scales  have  good 
psychometric  qualities  (Larkin,  1987;  Lennox  et  al.,  1984;  Shuptrine, 
Bearden, & Teel, 1990), and previous work with a Dutch version of the scales 
corroborates this (Steinel, 2004). Examples of items in the “ability” scale are 
(a) I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending 
on the impression I wish to give them; (b) When I feel that the image I am 
portraying isn’t working, I can readily change it to something that does; 
and (c) Once I know what the situation calls for, it’s easy for me to regulate 
my actions accordingly. Examples of items in the “sensitivity” scale are (a) 
In conversations I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial 
expression of the person I’m conversing with; (b) I can usually tell when others 
consider a joke to be bad taste, even though they may laugh convincingly; 
and (c) I can usually tell when I’ve said something inappropriate by reading 
it in the listener’s eyes. Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation 
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showed that the 13 items loaded on two factors as expected, and within 
scales ratings were averaged into an index for “self-monitoring ability” and 
“self-monitoring sensitivity.”
Hereafter, we proceeded as in Experiment 1. In one set of sessions (N = 77), 
participants in both the think-aloud and think-in-silence conditions were 
given small notes every 1½ minute to remind them of sticking to the think-
aloud  and  think-in-silence  instruction,  to  prevent  those  thinking-aloud 
from falling silent, and to treat those thinking-in-silence similarly as those 
thinking-aloud. In another set of sessions (N = 76), these notes were not 
given, and participants worked undisturbed for the entire period. Preliminary 
analyses showed no main or interaction effects involving type of session 
(all ts < 1.07, all ps > .28), and this factor is not discussed further. Upon 
completion of the creativity task participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
dismissed. 
As in Experiment 1, three judges independently coded individual responses 
to the unusual-uses test for (1) the number of ideas and (2) the number 
of original ideas. Interrater reliabilities were excellent (see table 2.1), and 
average ratings across judges were used in the analyses.
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2.3.2. Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics. Table 2.1 gives the zero-order correlations, means 
and standard deviations for all variables in this study. As can be seen self-
monitoring  ability  and  sensitivity  were  moderately  correlated,  and  self-
monitoring ability was negatively correlated with the number of original 
ideas. Consistent with Experiment 1 and other work showing that quantity 
relates to quality (Diehl et al., 1987; Nijstad et al., 2003a), the number of 
solutions was strongly and positively related to the originality of the ideas.
Table 2.1
Means, Scale Reliabilities, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations 
for All Study Variables in Experiment 2 (N=153)
M SD 1 2 3 4
1.   Ability to Modify  
Self-Presentation
27.42 5.16 0.85   0.30** -0.05 -0.19*
2.   Sensitivity to Other’s Expressive 
Behaviour
25.00 3.82 0.78 -0.03 -0.07
3. Number of Ideas   7.03 3.93 0.99 0.76*
4.   Number of Original Ideas   3.60 2.14 0.98
Note: Scale reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) are given on the diagonal;
*:  p < 0.05; 
**: p < 0.01
Number  of  ideas.  To  examine  whether  the  number  of  ideas  generated 
varied as a function of articulation, ability to modify self-presentation, and 
sensitivity to others’ expressive behavior, a multiple hierarchical regression 
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was computed with number of ideas as the dependent variable, and the 
main  effects  and  interaction  among  articulation,  ability  to  modify  self-
presentation, and sensitivity to other’s expressive behavior as the independent 
variables. Following Aiken and West (1991), elicitation method was dummy 
coded (thinking aloud = 1) and continuous predictor variables were centered 
around their mean before the interaction terms were calculated, and before 
they were entered into the regression equation. 
For the number of ideas (fluency),  the regression model was not significant, 
F (7, 145) = 0.66, p < .67, R2 = .04 (adjusted R2 = .02). Regression weights 
are summarized in table 2.2. Apart from a marginally significant three-way 
interaction, no single regression weight was significant. Exploratory follow-up 
analyses including simple slope tests revealed no significant effects whatsoever 
(all ts < 1.20, all ps > .25), so that it is concluded that articulation, ability 
to modify self-presentation, and sensitivity to others’ expressive behavior, 
alone or in combination, has no significant influence on the number of ideas 
generated. This conclusion is consistent with the observation in Experiment 
1 that elicitation method had no effect on fluency.
Originality  of  ideas.  To  test  our  prediction  about  creativity,  a  multiple 
hierarchical regression was computed with number of original ideas as the 
dependent variable, and the main effects for, and interactions among articu-
lation, ability to modify self-presentation, and sensitivity to others’ expressive 
behavior as the independent variables. This regression model was significant, 
F (7, 145) = 4.35, p < .001, R2 = .20 (adjusted R2 = .15). Regression weights 
are summarized in table 2.2. Consistent with Experiment 1, we found a 
significant  main  effect  for  articulation.  Participants  in  the  think-aloud 
condition generated fewer original ideas (M = 3.87) than those in the think-
in-silence condition (M = 4.68), t = 2.01, p < .05 (see also figure 2.2).
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Table 2.2
Regression of number of ideas and originality of ideas on articulation, 
ability  to  modify  self-presentation,  sensitivity  to  other’s  expressive 
behaviour, and their interactions; Experiment 2 (N=153)
Number of ideas Originality of ideas
B (SE) b t B (SE) b t
Constant 7.51 (3.03) 2.48** 1.64 (1.88)   0.38
AMSP -0.03 (0.11) -0.00 -0.01 0.04 (0.06) 0.04   0.34
SOEB -0.01 (0.11) -0.04 -0.27 0.01 (0.07) 0.07   0.61
Articulation (Art) -0.54 (0.62) -0.08 -0.86 -0.77 (0.39) -0.16   -2.01**
Art*AMSP -0.04 (0.14) -0.04 -0.43 -0.03 (0.09) -0.04   -0.41
Art*SOEB -0.08 (0.16) -0.06 -0.52 -0.09 (0.10) -0.11   -1.00
AMSP*SOEB 0.02 (0.18) 0.08 0.76 -0.01 (0.02) -0.04   -0.43
AMSP*SOEB* Art -0.05 (0.03) -0.21 -1.90* -0.04 (0.02) -0.22   -2.12**
Note. 
AMSP   = Ability to Modify Self-Presentation;  
SOEB  = Sensitivity to Other’s Expressive Behavior;  
Art   = Articulation (dummy coded, with 1 = think aloud; 0 = think silent); 
  * p < .10  
 ** p < .05,  
  *** p < .01 (N = 153).  




















Effects of articulation on fl  uency (number of unique ideas) and originality 
(number of original ideas); Experiment 2
As predicted, this main effect for articulation was qualifi  ed by a three-way 
interaction  among  articulation,  ability  to  modify  self-presentation,  and 
sensitivity to others’ expressive behavior. To interpret the complex three-
way interaction we ran separate regressions within the think aloud, and the 
think silent conditions. In each case, the main effects for, and interactions 
among ability and sensitivity were entered as the independent variables. 
Originality of ideas served as the dependent variable. In the think-in-silence 
condition, the regression model was not signifi  cant, F (3, 72) = 0.64, p < .59, 
R2 = .03, and no single regression weight reached signifi  cance. When thinking 
in silence, slopes for ability to modify self-presentation do not differ as a 
function of sensitivity to other’s expressive behavior, Bs < |0.01|, ts < 1, ns. 
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In the think-aloud condition, the regression model was significant, F (3, 76) 
= 2.91, p < .05, R2 = .11. Inspection of the regression weights only revealed a 
significant effect for the interaction between ability and sensitivity, B = -.45, 
t = -2.33, p < .025. Test for simple slopes revealed that when the sensitivity 
to others’ expressions was low, ability to adapt had no significant relationship 
with originality, B = 0.09, t = 0.92, p < .36. As predicted, however, when 
sensitivity was high, low ability to adapt negatively related to originality,   
B = -0.30, t = -2.26, p < .027. In other words: When thinking aloud, the 
number of original ideas is reduced for those with high rather than low 
sensitivity to other’s expressive behavior when the ability to self-monitor is 
low rather than high. 
2.4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Although some work in both cognitive and social psychology suggested 
that thinking aloud helps creativity, the current set of experiments extends 
emerging research showing that thinking aloud reduces creative ideation. 
Furthermore,  Experiment  2  shows  that  thinking  aloud  reduces  creativity 
especially when individuals are highly sensitive to others’ expressions and low 
in ability to adapt to these expressions. These results not only corroborate that 
thinking aloud hinders rather than helps ideation, it also provide interesting 
cues as to when, and for whom this effect of articulation is particularly 
pronounced. For instance, that sensitivity only hurts creativity when ability 
is low suggests that for some individuals more than for others the real or 
imagined evaluation by others taxes cognitive capacity and reduces creative 
performance. Especially among those individuals high in sensitivity to others’ 
expressions and low in the ability to adapt to others, the mere feeling that 
“someone is looking over my shoulder” may be enough to reduce creative 
performance.
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A viable explanation for the results of the two experiments together is that 
thinking aloud requires more cognitive capacity than thinking silently, in part 
because thinking aloud activates social and contextual concerns. As such, our 
results resonate well with those obtained by Camacho and Paulus (1995) and 
Connolly et al. (Connolly et al., 1990) who showed that social anxiousness 
and identifiability reduces creativity in group brainstorming. However, we 
believe that our work adds to these findings in three critical ways. First, we 
demonstrated that effects of self-monitoring were present only when people 
thought aloud instead of in silence. Second, we demonstrated that these 
effects emerge in individual settings when people work alone. 
Third, and finally, our work showed that social pressures have greater impact 
among those with low ability to adapt to others’ (expected) expressions. 
This finding is important because it suggests that social anxiousness and 
identifiability  impact  creative  ideation  and  brainstorming  performance 
especially when people have difficulty adapting, and not when people easily 
adapt to others. This implication may be tested in brainstorming groups 
composed of members with high vs. low sensitivity to others’ expression, 
and high vs. low ability to modify their behavior. On the basis of current 
results we would predict production losses especially when group members’ 
sensitivity is high and their ability to adapt is low.
The finding that self-monitoring moderated the effects of elicitation method 
on creative thinking may seem inconsistent with the finding by Diehl and 
Stroebe (1987, 1991) that social anxiety and evaluation apprehension had little 
effect on individual and group brainstorming. This apparent inconsistency 
can, however, be easily understood when we realize that their studies did not 
differentiate between the level of social anxiety (or evaluation apprehension) 
and the ease or difficulty in managing and coping with that social anxiety. 
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Unlike this previous work, we explicitly distinguished between the extent   
to which people are sensitive to others and their ability to adapt to others. 
We argued and found that only when people have low ability to adapt 
sensitivity exerts its influence. Put differently, the current work contributes to 
our understanding when and why self-monitoring, social anxiety, evaluation 
apprehension  and  related  constructs  do,  and  do  not,  influence  creative 
performance and the relationship between some antecedent condition (like 
elicitation procedure) and creativity.
Whereas in the present work ease of adaptability and sensitivity to others’ 
expressions were conceived as chronic individual differences, situations may 
have a similar function. That is, some situations may make people more 
sensitive to others’ expressions. Whether people work alone or in a group, 
and whether their contribution can be identified or not are just two examples. 
Also, the ability with which one adapts to others may be influenced by 
the situation. For example, under high time pressure people have greater 
need for cognitive closure, and tend to be less creative (Chirumbolo, Livi, 
Manetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2004). Perhaps that time pressure reduces the 
adaptability component as well, and thereby moderates the effect of thinking 
aloud on creative idea generation. Obviously, we are speculating here and 
research is needed to test effects of situational constraints on creativity when 
people think aloud, or in silence.
In developing our confirmed prediction that thinking aloud hurts creative 
performance, we relied on work by Schooler et al. (1993), Kim (2002), and 
Fleck and Weisberg (2004). We reasoned that verbal overshadowing may not 
transfer comfortably from insight problems to creative performance because 
creative performance requires cognitive flexibility, divergent thinking and 
fluency, as well as being original. Our results showed that although fluency 
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and originality were strongly correlated, only originality was influenced by 
articulation and fluency was not. Because only originality was also influenced 
by the interaction among articulation, self-monitoring sensitivity and ability, 
it may be that fluency and originality are highly correlated but not causally 
linked. Both aspects of creativity co-exist and are partially driven by the same 
process, and partially driven by different processes (Rietzschel, Nijstad, & 
Stroebe, 2006). Future research is needed to further explore this possibility, to 
further understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying quantity 
and quality of ideation.
Related to the question of how quantity and quality are related is what the 
role of the third component of creativity not considered in these experiments 
would be – how does elicitation method influence cognitive flexibility and 
will self-monitoring moderate this relationship in much the same way as was 
found for originality?  Flexibility, fluency, and originality are interrelated yet 
distinct components and to our knowledge there is no clear-cut theoretical 
account that allows one to predict a priori whether fluency, flexibility, or 
originality will be affected and how the three are interrelated in any specific 
context (Rietzschel, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2006). Thus, it largely is an empirical 
issue and future work on elicitation procedures and thinking aloud would 
benefit from including assessments of cognitive flexibility as well. 
Recall that Wetzstein and Hacker (2004) found that reflective verbalization 
increased the quality of object design, and we interpreted this finding as 
suggesting that thinking aloud may stimulate creativity. Clearly, our results 
suggest  otherwise,  but  this  begs  the  question  what  then  explains  the 
discrepancy between the present findings and those reported by Wetzstein 
and Hacker. One possibility is that there is a fundamental difference in the 
psychological processes underlying creative performance and object design. 
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While possibly true, an alternative is related to the fact that in the current 
experiments participants had to give a concurrent verbal report of their 
cognitive activity, whereas in the Wetzstein and Hacker study, participants 
interrupted  their  design  activity  to  give  a  verbal  report,  and  thereafter 
continued with their design. Perhaps that the timing of verbalization makes 
a critical difference, and future research could test this possibility. Based 
on our analysis, we would predict that concurrent verbalization undermines 
creativity, and that intermediate verbalization may help.
To some extent our work was motivated by the observation that in applied 
settings  people  are  often  stimulated  to  think  aloud  because  this  would 
help them solve their problems and promote creativity in the work place. 
Although social sharing of creative ideas may promote creativity because 
people get exposed to new information, new perspectives, and new mental 
categories (cf., Nijstad & Paulus, 2003), the present work shows that thinking 
aloud hurts creativity. Whether in the end the net result of thinking aloud 
and social sharing is positive remains to be seen. At the very least, the 
recommendation to think aloud should be made only to those individuals 
that are low in sensitivity to others’ expressions, or to those with high ability 
to adapt. Otherwise, thinking aloud hurts rather than helps creativity.
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CHAPTER 3  
INTERMEZZOS FOR THINKING ALONE: HOW SUSPENDING GROUP DEbATE 
CAN ENHANCE GROUP PRObLEM SOLVING PERFORMANCE
Abstract
Although the management literature assumes that group debate enhances 
group performance, we propose that group performance can under certain 
conditions benefit from temporarily suspending debate. Our core insight is 
that for teams with at least one team member with relatively low extraversion, 
holding an intermezzo for thinking alone during a group meeting increases 
group  problem  solving  performance,  i.c.  increases  the  number  of  ideas 
generated by the team, without harming the average quality of each idea. 
These predictions were supported by findings from a randomized experiment 
with 45 real (not ad hoc) teams working on a real problem at a university. 
3.1. INTRODUCTION
There is a significant debate in the management literature about the impact 
of group debate on team performance. For example, Simons, Pelled and 
Smith (1999) find that debate characterized by defending viewpoints and 
challenging those of others allows teams to capture the benefits of diversity. 
Postmes, Spears and Cihangir (2001) find that critical debate, rather than 
debate  focused  on  consensus,  positively  affects  information  sharing,  a 
key factor influencing group performance. Jehn and Mannix (2001) find 
that  debate  characterized  by  moderate  task  conflict  at  the  midpoint  of 
group  interaction  positively  influences  group  performance.  Barkema  and   
Chyrkov  claim  that  constructive  debate  mediates  the  effect  of  top 
management team diversity on strategic innovation, such as technological 
Dissertation_rotis Serif_SW.indd31   31 07.08.2007   9:43:39 Uhr32
and bureaucratic innovation, entry into new product markets, and so on 
(Barkema et al., 2007).
The  underlying  assumption  in  such  and  other  management  literature  is 
that group debate is more effective than individuals working alone without 
interaction. Also practitioners tend to think that group interaction, e.g. in 
group brainstorming, is more effective than working alone (Paulus, Larey, & 
Ortega, 1995). The management literature about group debate is suffering 
from  an  important  gap:  there  is  no  recognition  that,  rather  than  only 
benefiting from improving debate, teams might benefit from (temporarily) 
suspending debate. 
Our study uses a social cognitive psychological lens to study the advantages 
and disadvantages of group debate. Our core insight is that temporarily 
suspending debate, i.e. holding an intermezzo for thinking alone during 
group meetings, can improve actual group problem solving performance, 
specifically the number of ideas generated (without harming the quality of 
each idea generated), for teams with one or more members relatively low in 
extraversion. 
We believe that our insight also has value for practitioners. Although prior 
research has established the benefits of thinking alone, this insight has not 
been put into practice: group sessions to generate ideas (‘group brainstorms’) 
are still used widely. This may be because of the illusion of group effectivity, 
the false perception that groups are more effective than the same number 
of  individuals  thinking  alone  in  generating  ideas  (Paulus  &  Dzindolet, 
1993; Paulus et al., 1995; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1992), and may 
be because most people derive more satisfaction, more enjoyment, from 
generating ideas in a group than generating ideas alone (Diehl et al., 1991; 
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Paulus et al., 1995; Stroebe et al., 1992). Holding an intermezzo for thinking 
alone allows groups to work as groups whilst simultaneously capturing the 
benefits of working alone for idea generation. Specifically, whenever a team 
needs to generate ideas (and given the importance of innovation in the 
current business context, this need arises often), and if at least one of the 
team members is relatively introverted, it may pay to hold an intermezzo for 
thinking alone, e.g. by spending 5 minutes writing down ideas whilst staying 
seated at the meeting table. Such an intermezzo can substantially increase 
the number of ideas generated (can even double it, in our study). 
Our theory is supported by a randomized experiment (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 
1998; Cook & Campbell, 1979) with 45 real teams (i.e. groups of individuals with 
a history of collaboration) with 206 team members working on a real problem   
(i.e. lack of desk space at Tilburg University).
In  the  following  sections  we  first  provide  conceptual  background,  then 
develop our theory and hypotheses, subject these to a test, and discuss the 
results.
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3.2. CONCEPTUAL bACKGROUND
We review literature on problem solving in groups, on advantages of group 
debate and of suspending group debate, and on extraversion (a moderator 
in our study).
3.2.1. Problem solving in groups
The problem solving performance of groups (e.g. number of solution ideas, 
solution quality and problem solving speed) affects overall group performance 
(e.g. in terms of product quality, development time and development cost for 
NPD teams) (Atuahene-Gima, 2003).  The number of solution ideas generated 
is traditionally considered important for the quality of solutions: the more 
ideas generated, the higher the likelihood of generating a high quality idea, 
using a variation-selection or funnel logic (Campbell, 1969; Nijstad, 2000; 
Simonton, 1998, 1999). Hence, we believe that advancing the understanding 
of the antecedents of the number of (solution) ideas generated by a group is 
an important avenue for research. 
Building on prior studies (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Atuahene-Gima, 2003; 
Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Keller, 2001; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001), 
we conceptualize team problem solving as cognitive information processing, 
consisting of cycles of three processes 1) information sharing inside the 
team, 2) idea generating (e.g. problem solutions, decision alternatives) and 
3) idea selecting. For example, after team members from different functional 
departments have accessed information through external communications, 
they share their ideas in a group meeting. In that meeting, individual team 
members personally combine the ideas shared by others and own ideas into 
new ideas and share these again in the group. Others may then in that 
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meeting combine these ideas further with other ideas and share the insights 
in the group again.  Finally, the group selects the good ideas. 
3.2.2. Advantages of group debate: information sharing (phase 1) and idea 
selection (phase 3)
Other research has established that information sharing is important for 
group performance (Postmes et al., 2001; Stasser, 1992; Stasser, Vaughan, 
& Stewart, 2000). Especially when information and perspectives of group 
members  are  heterogeneous,  deep  information  sharing  (i.e.  explaining 
and defending own perspectives and challenging that of others) positively 
influences group performance (Simons et al., 1999). Such deep information 
sharing is made possible by group debate, hence one of the advantages of 
group debate over individuals working alone is the potential offered for deep 
information sharing.
Research has also found that groups are better than individuals at selecting 
ideas  (Laughlin,  Vanderstoep,  &  Hollingshead,  1991;  Laughlin,  Zander, 
Knievel, & Tan, 2003). These studies found that groups are more likely than 
individuals to recognize good ideas and to reject bad ideas. Hence, another 
advantage of group debate over individuals working alone is the ability to 
more reliably select the best ideas.
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3.2.3. Advantages of suspending group debate: idea generation (phase 2)
Alex Osborn (1953) proposed to use brainstorming in groups to enhance idea 
generation. However, social cognitive psychology research has found in the 
last two decades that real groups produce fewer ideas than nominal groups, 
i.e. an equivalent number of individuals working alone, do (Diehl et al., 1987, 
1991; Mullen et al., 1991; Nijstad et al., 2003b; Nijstad, van Vianen, Stroebe, 
&  Lodewijkx,  2004;  Stroebe  et  al.,  1994;  Stroebe  et  al.,  1992).  Various 
explanations have been offered for the performance disadvantage of groups 
vs. an equivalent number of individuals, including evaluation apprehension 
(members are cautious in expressing new ideas because of the following 
evaluation of the ideas by others), free riding (members let others generate 
and share ideas), and production blocking (Diehl et al., 1987, 1991): the 
production of ideas by individuals is blocked in groups because only one 
person can talk at a time and others need to pay attention in order to notice 
when they can state their own ideas and need to focus on remembering 
the idea they want contribute. As a result of this they are blocked in the 
production of further ideas. The larger the group the more time each member 
needs to spend listening to others and the more each member is blocked in 
his or her production of ideas (ibid). 
Recent  research  found  that  part  of  the  productivity  loss  observed  in 
interacting brainstorming groups may be due to inhibited performance of 
individuals who are uncomfortable with group interaction, i.e. of individuals 
who are socially anxious (Camacho et al., 1995) or particularly challenged 
in social situations (Chapter 2). These individuals who are uncomfortable 
or less able in group settings may even influence others in the group to 
lower performance in line with the formers’ inhibited performance level, in a 
matching process (Camacho et al., 1995; Paulus et al., 1993). 
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However,  although  the  research  evidence  in  favour  of  generating  ideas 
alone rather than in groups is massive, it has not been (and is not likely 
to be) adopted in practice. This is because, those experiencing individual 
brainstorming perceive it to be less effective than those experiencing group 
brainstorming (Paulus et al., 1993; Paulus et al., 1995; Stroebe et al., 1992). 
This is best explained by giving an example: assume individuals generate 4 
ideas per minute when brainstorming alone (one idea every 15 seconds), and 
a group of 5 individuals generates 10 ideas per minute (one idea every 6 
seconds). In such a setting, individuals will perceive the group as clearly more 
effective for generating ideas (an idea every 6 seconds rather than every 15 
seconds). However, combining the ideas of 5 individuals working alone and 
each generating 4 ideas per minute, leads to 20 ideas per minute, excluding 
overlap perhaps 15 ideas per minute, still clearly more than the 10 ideas per 
minute the interacting group generated. In the cited studies the effect of 
eliminating production blocking has always been large enough to offset any 
losses due to overlap in ideas generated by individuals thinking alone. 
The example offers an explanation why nominal groups (individuals thinking 
alone)  can  actually  outperform  groups  whilst  simultaneously  individuals 
perceive groups to be more productive than individuals thinking alone. The 
phenomenon that problem solving performance is perceived to be lower for 
individuals working alone than for individuals working together affects the 
likelihood of continued and extensive use of nominal groups for generating 
ideas. In addition, the phenomenon that most people achieve more personal 
satisfaction, more enjoyment, from generating ideas in a group rather than 
alone (Diehl et al., 1991; Paulus et al., 1995; Stroebe et al., 1992) may explain 
why generating ideas as a group is still widespread, despite the research 
evidence that generating ideas alone is more effective.
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3.2.4. Extraversion
One personality characteristic relevant to comparing effectiveness of group 
work versus individual work is extraversion, one of the five most salient 
personality characteristics (together known as the Big Five). The Big Five, 
a five factor model of personality, emerged after decades of personality 
research in the 20th century and is supported by a considerable amount 
of research (e.g. Costa & McCrae, 1988; Digman, 1989; Goldberg, 1990; 
McCrae & Costa, 1997; McCrae & John, 1992). Jung (1923) brought the 
extraversion-introversion dichotomy into common usage, although, as he 
acknowledges, the concept has a history extending back to Schiller, Nietzsche 
and others. Jung brought the concepts into common parlance and suggested 
that extraversion is a matter of attentional orientation: for an introvert the 
stimuli considered worthy of attention are those in the introvert’s own mind, 
whereas for an extraverted individual what is considered worthy of attention 
is the outside world.
 
Importantly,  extraverted  individuals  have  been  found  to  be  better  at 
multitasking  than  introverted  individuals  are  (Lieberman  &  Rosenthal, 
2001). They found that, despite the popular notion that introverts are less 
effective at decoding nonverbal cues in conversation, introverts are as good 
in nonverbal decoding as extraverts are when such decoding is the only task. 
When decoding was a secondary task in a multitasking context, introverts 
exhibited a nonverbal decoding deficit. The lower ability to multitask for 
those with low extraversion is very relevant in group settings, because group 
settings often require multitasking, e.g. listening to others, generating own 
ideas, and monitoring the conversation in order to time the sharing of own 
ideas.
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3.3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
As  discussed,  group  debate  allows  accessing  and  deep  sharing  of  ideas 
from diverse sources of information and perspectives, which is not feasible 
without group interaction, and group debate (as opposed to individuals 
working alone) leads to better idea selection. However, individuals generate 
ideas more quickly when thinking alone than when discussing in a group 
setting. Thus, we propose that allowing teams in their meetings to first share 
information and generate ideas as a group and then interjecting into the 
meeting an intermezzo for thinking alone to stimulate idea generation, and 
then allowing the team time to select the good ideas and generate further 
ideas based on them, can be beneficial for problem solving performance, 
specifically the number of ideas generated. Such a sequence allows team 
members to build on each other’s ideas when generating ideas, allows team 
members to generate ideas alone (i.e. without production blocking), and 
allows teams to select the good ideas (and possibly to build on these and/or 
combine these into more advanced ideas). Without an intermezzo for thinking 
alone, a group does not benefit from the advantages of idea generation by 
individuals thinking alone (i.e. relief from production blocking). 
H1:   An  intermezzo  for  thinking  alone  during  a  team  meeting 
positively affects the number of ideas generated by the team. 
The size of the effect of an intermezzo on the number of ideas generated 
(hypothesis 1) is likely to depend on the degree to which team members are 
effective in group settings versus in individual settings. Generating ideas in a 
group setting requires multitasking, i.e. it requires individuals to both generate 
ideas, to listen to the ideas of others, and to monitor when it is a good time 
to share own ideas. An intermezzo for thinking alone provides a relief of the 
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need for multitasking. It allows individuals to focus their entire attention 
on generating ideas, without having to simultaneously attend to others in 
the team. Individuals who are low in extraversion are less able to multitask 
(Lieberman et al., 2001), and tend to be more socially anxious (Kelly, Jones, 
& Adams, 2002; Leary & Kowalski, 1993) and hence less comfortable and 
effective in group settings (Camacho et al., 1995). Thus, teams who consist 
of individuals who are all relatively low in extraversion will benefit from an 
intermezzo, whereas teams who consist of individuals who are relatively high 
in extraversion will not benefit, because not having to multitask as a result 
of having an intermezzo is not useful when one is good at multitasking and 
because individuals high in extraversion are low in social anxiety and hence 
their performance is not impaired in group settings. 
If just one individual in the team is relatively low in extraversion and hence 
poor at multitasking, and socially anxious, then this individual will benefit 
from  the  team  having  an  intermezzo  for  thinking  alone.  This  relatively 
introverted  individual  will  benefit  by  being  able  to  concentrate  entirely 
on idea generation during the intermezzo, and will generate more ideas 
than if there were no intermezzo for thinking alone. The higher number 
of ideas generated by the relatively introverted individual as a result of the 
intermezzo will enrich the team debate after the intermezzo: these extra 
ideas of the relatively introverted individual may be combined with ideas of 
others or may be adopted as team ideas unchanged. Also, the higher number 
of ideas generated by the relatively introverted team member may affect 
the performance of the other team members through a matching process. A 
matching process is the phenomenon that team members adapt performance 
to that of the least productive member. Paulus and Dzindolet (1993) found 
evidence for such a matching process in that idea generation performance 
of individuals in groups was more similar than performance of individuals in 
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non-interacting groups and that performance of the least productive members 
was most infl  uential in determining group performance. Individuals low in 
extraversion are more likely than those high in extraversion to be relatively 
low in productivity in group settings, given their lower ability to multitask 
and their higher social anxiety. Hence, when an intermezzo increases the 
effectiveness of especially introverted individuals, it is probably increasing 
the effectiveness of the least productive member, and hence increasing the 
level to which more effective team members match down to. In sum, when 
the team member with the lowest extraversion is relatively introverted, the 
intermezzo positively affects the number of ideas generated; otherwise there 
is no effect. See hypothesis 2 and fi  gure 3.1.
H2:   The effect of holding an intermezzo on the number of ideas 
generated by a team depends on the extraversion of the team 
member  with  the  lowest  extraversion  in  the  team:  when  at 
least one or more team members are relatively introverted the 
intermezzo has a positive effect on the number ideas generated 
by the team; otherwise there is no effect.
Figure 3.1
Theoretical Framework
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3.4. METHOD
3.4.1. Design and sample
Forty-five teams of 4 to 5 business students each (206 students in total), 
with 2 months of experience working together intensively on an unrelated 
business simulation game, took part, for course credit, with prizes available 
for the best teams to increase motivation. Each team took part in a separate 
session  in  which  they  were  asked  to  develop  recommendations  for  how 
Tilburg  University  could  reduce  the  shortage  of  available  deskspace  for 
students. The shortage of available deskspace was a real problem, there were 
no standard right or wrong solutions and there was room for creativity. Hence 
the task was complex and non-routine; it required a significant problem-
solving effort and was thus suitable to test our theory. In addition, students 
knew the problem and the campus well given their own experience and thus 
had sufficient knowledge to be able to develop solutions. Half of the teams 
was  randomly  allocated  to  the  intermezzo-for-individual-brainstorming 
condition, the other half to the control condition (“intermezzo for group 
brainstorming”).  
We use a randomized experiment (Aronson et al., 1998; Cook et al., 1979) 
rather than observations or a survey, because 1. creating intermezzos for 
thinking alone is not (yet) common within group meetings, because 2. when 
manipulation of conditions and randomisation are possible, experiments offer 
compelling advantages in terms of internal validity, and because 3. we wanted 
to keep the task and intermezzo characteristics constant across conditions 
to enhance statistical validity. We did the experiment in a university setting 
because 1. we were there able to find a large enough sample of real teams 
of individuals who had been working together as a team for two months 
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(rather than having to work with ad-hoc teams), thus enhancing external 
validity, because 2. we  were able to use a realistic task with teams working 
on a practical problem on campus (lack of desk space) with which they were 
highly familiar. So, as in companies existing teams (e.g. management teams 
or other teams) are frequently asked to work on a problem for which they 
have relevant knowledge, in our setting too real teams were given the task 
to work on a real problem with which they had real experience. Combined 
with the fact that we were able to randomize allocation to condition we 
believe that our method and setting provides both high internal and external 
validity.
3.4.2. Procedure
The experiment took place in the context of a course organized around 
a business simulation game. We first let the students work in their teams 
for two months so that in the experiment we would be dealing with real 
teams, rather than ad-hoc teams. We then invited each student team to an 
obligatory session for our current experiment. Two experimenters executed 
the experiments with the 45 teams in the course of two weeks. 
Upon arrival, a student team was seated in a meeting room and was given 
instructions  written  on  a  table  display  to  develop  recommendations  for 
reducing the shortage of available tables for studying individually and in 
groups on the campus of Tilburg University (e.g. in the library). Then the 
experimenter left the room. After precisely 5 minutes of group discussion 
the  experimenter  interrupted  the  team  and  asked  the  team  to  continue 
for five minutes to brainstorm about possible recommendations, either in 
silence (individually) (experimental condition ‘no group debate’) or in group 
discussion (control condition ‘group debate’). We did not give any further 
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instructions, such as Osborn’s brainstorm rules (e.g. deferment of judgment). 
The experimenter left and returned after 5 minutes, and instructed teams 
to continue now with the group discussion to develop the best possible 
recommendation. Note that in order to have an intermezzo for thinking 
alone interruptions of the group discussion are necessary, but also note that 
we held similar interruptions in the control condition as well in order to 
allow us to attribute any found effects to the intermezzo for thinking alone 
itself and not to any positive effects that interruptions may have per se 
(e.g. allowing a step back, allowing consideration of a second agenda, cf. 
Okhuysen (2001)).
After the students completed the task, the experimenters gave them a short 
survey, held an interactive mini-lecture on groundbreaking research on how 
to enhance team problem solving performance, thanked the students and 
asked them to keep the contents of the experiment and their solutions 
secret for two weeks. The experimenters announced that bottles of sparkling 
wine would be awarded to teams who developed relatively good solutions 
in comparison to other teams, thus giving teams an additional incentive to 
keep their solutions secret for two weeks. 
3.4.3. Measures
Number of ideas generated was measured by having two judges count the 
number of ideas proposed by each team. The Cronbach’s alpha of their 
counts was 0.96 and we created a composite measure by taking the average 
of the two counts. This approach has been used previously in brainstorming 
studies (Chapter 2; Diehl et al., 1987, 1991; Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Nijstad 
et al., 2003b).
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Extraversion was measured using the official Dutch version (Harcourt, 2006) 
of the NEO-FFI, a scale widely used (e.g. Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 
2001; Hofmann & Jones, 2005; Porter et al., 2003) to measure extraversion 
(with  12  items)  and  the  other  four  personality  factors  in  the  Big  Five.   
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.8 for this extraversion scale.
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3.5. RESULTS
3.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 gives the means, standard deviations, and the zero-order correlations 
for all variables in this study. Extraversion and the measure for the share of 
team members with high sensitivity to others and low ability to adapt were 
correlated, consistent with prior literature (Briggs et al., 1980). 
Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics and correlations (n=45)
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2
1. Minimum of extraversion 36.42 4.03
2. Number of ideas 4.06 2.33 -0.11
*: p < 0.05 (two-sided)
3.5.2. Main effect of intermezzo for thinking alone 
To examine whether holding an intermezzo for thinking alone influenced the 
number of ideas generated we computed a univariate analysis of variance. 
We found that the intermezzo increased the number of ideas generated 
(F(1,43)=5.05, p<0.031), consistent with hypothesis 1. The mean number 
of ideas in the individual intermezzo condition was 4.8, approximately 50% 
higher than in the group intermezzo condition (M=3.3). 
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3.5.3. Interactions with the intermezzo for thinking alone 
To test the influence of the minimum of extraversion in the team on the 
effect of the intermezzo for thinking alone we computed a linear regression 
with number of ideas generated as the dependent and as independents 
the  condition,  minimum  of  extraversion  and  the  interaction  (centralized 
as  suggested  by  Aiken  and  West  (1991)).  The  model  was  significant, 
F (3,41) = 3.89, p < 0.02. The intermezzo coefficient is positive and significant 
(t = 2.71, p < 0.01 two-tailed), the minimum of extraversion is not significant, 
but the interaction is statistically significant (t =-2.00, p < 0.053, two-tailed). 
When  minimum  extraversion  is  one  standard  deviation  below  its  mean, 
the intermezzo has a positive effect: the average number of ideas is 3.2   
without  intermezzo  for  thinking  alone,  and  6.3  with  intermezzo.  When 
minimum  extraversion  is  one  standard  deviation  above  its  mean,  the 
intermezzo  has  no  effect:  the  average  number  of  ideas  is  3.5  without 
intermezzo for thinking alone, and 3.9 with intermezzo (see figure 3.2). We 
tested the significance of these effects by recentering the interaction term in 
the regression: we first centered the minimum of extraversion component of 
the interaction term on one standard deviation below the mean of minimum 
of extraversion, and reran the regression. The coefficient of the intermezzo 
condition was highly significant (t = 3.3, p < 0.003 one sided). Second, we 
centered the minimum of extraversion component of the interaction term on 
one standard deviation above mean of minimum of extraversion, and reran 
the regression. In this case the coefficient of the intermezzo condition was 
not significant (t = 0.49, p < 0.7 two-sided). 
For completeness, we also tested the effect of the intermezzo when the 
minimum of extraversion was at the level of the average extraversion in the 
entire sample of 229 individuals (not significant, p < 0.83), and when it was 
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at the level of one standard deviation below that of the average extraversion 
in the entire sample (signifi  cant, p < 0.045).
Figure 3.2
Interaction of Intermezzo and Minimum of Extraversion of Team 
Members
3.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Practitioners and management scholars alike assume that group debate is 
important for group (problem solving) performance. We, however, proposed 
that temporarily suspending group debate by holding an intermezzo for 
thinking alone can be good for group problem solving performance, and 
hence for overall group performance. Specifi  cally, we believe that group 
debate is important for information sharing and idea selection, and that 
suspending group debate is important for idea generation. We have theorized 
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about how to let teams combine the benefits of debate and of suspending 
debate. We believe that it is desirable to let a period of group debate (for 
sharing information) be followed by an intermezzo for thinking alone (for 
idea generation based on shared information and own information), followed 
again by a period of group debate (for sharing new ideas, combining them 
further and selecting the best ideas). We predicted a main effect of such a 
temporary suspension of group debate during a group meeting on group 
performance as well as an interaction effect with the extraversion of the least 
extraverted team member. 
What  we  find  is  that  holding  an  intermezzo  for  thinking  alone  indeed 
positively and significantly affects the number of ideas generated: teams with 
one or more team members with relatively low extraversion generate nearly 
twice as many ideas than when such teams would not hold an intermezzo 
for thinking alone. In a metareview of brainstorming studies, Mullen and 
colleagues (1991) found that non-interacting groups on average generate 
two times more ideas than normal groups. In our study we were able to 
achieve a similar two-fold increase in number of ideas generated, with just a 
5 minute intermezzo for thinking alone. 
A core assumption underlying this paper is that increasing the number of 
ideas is useful because it increases the likelihood of generating high quality 
ideas. This may be false if increased quantity comes at the cost of decreased 
quality. In order to test this, we collected and analyzed some additional data. 
We measured two aspects of quality, i.e. the practicality of an idea and the 
originality of an idea. We asked judges to rate the practicality of each idea, 
defined as the extent to which an idea is likely to be implemented, on a scale 
of 1-5 (cf. Goncalo et al., 2006). Cronbach’s alpha of the ratings of the two 
judges was good (0.76) and hence we used the average of the ratings of the 
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two judges as our measure of quality. We measured originality of an idea by 
counting the number of times an idea was mentioned across the 45 teams, 
and coded an idea as either original (no other teams had the same idea) 
or not original. We found no significant correlations between the number 
of ideas a team generated, the average practicality per idea of the ideas 
generated by each team and the average originality per idea (i.e. the share of 
a team’s ideas that was original). We also ran two regressions with respectively 
average idea practicality and average originality as the dependent variables 
and the intermezzo condition, minimum of extraversion and their interaction 
as independents. None of the independents’ coefficients was significant. As 
expected from this pattern of results, similar regressions with as dependent 
variables respectively the number of ideas above average in practicality and 
the number of ideas that is original, did yield significant effects for the 
intermezzo and the interaction of intermezzo and minimum of extraversion 
(p’s<0.05 two-tailed), when centralized at low minimum of extraversion).
This supports the logic that increasing the number of ideas is a worthwhile 
pursuit, because if the average quality of ideas is unaffected, generating 
more ideas will generate more (very) high quality ideas, and because teams 
are relatively effective at rejecting low quality ideas and identifying the high 
quality ideas (Laughlin, Hatch, Silver, & Boh, 2006; Laughlin et al., 1991). 
It would be worthwhile to repeat this study, with teams of managers in an 
organization and without the somewhat artificial time constraints (e.g. no 
fixed length of time for the intermezzo, or for the discussion periods before 
and after the intermezzo. In addition, it would be interesting to measure 
information sharing and idea selection. For instance, after allowing teams 
to generate as many ideas as they can, a phase for idea selection could be 
added, in which teams select one single idea (this would allow measuring 
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the effect of the intermezzo directly on the quality of the idea remaining 
after group selection). Finally, in a next study it would also be powerful to 
measure idea generation before and after the intermezzo.
We believe we have combined important ideas into a theory of group meetings 
that will help innovating teams improve their performance. Our notion of 
intermezzos for thinking alone in order to increase the number of ideas 
teams generate should be highly valuable for practitioners: when a team (e.g. 
a management team, an R&D team, a new product development team, a 
strategy development team, an organizational improvement team) is in need 
of more good ideas (which is often the case in the current business context 
in which the need for innovation is high) and if at least one team member is 
relatively introverted, holding an intermezzo for thinking alone as opposed 
to continuing group discussion may substantially increase (even double!) the 
ideas generated, without requiring a lot of time (e.g. just 5 minutes) (and 
despite the fact that thinking alone may require more discipline than group 
debate). Hence, we have identified a highly efficient way for managers to 
increase team creativity: using an intermezzo can dramatically increase team 
creativity, but requires no financial resources, and only 5 minutes of the time 
of human resources on the team. 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE EFFECT OF GROUP DEbATE ON STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AbOUT 
INNOVATION
Abstract
This paper adds to the debate about strategic decision making about innovation 
by studying the effect of debate on the type of decision taken (adopting an 
incremental vs. a radical innovation for market launch). Building on a number 
of strands of cognitive psychology and social psychology literature, our core 
insight is that for groups consisting of members with relatively low ability 
to modify self-presentation (and hence reduced available cognitive capacity 
in social settings and low ability to express thoughts and feelings), debate 
decreases the likelihood of deciding for a radical innovation (as opposed to for 
an incremental innovation), whereas for groups consisting of members with 
relatively high ability to modify self-presentation, group debate increases this 
likelihood. This was supported by findings from a randomized experiment 
with 39 real (not created ad-hoc) teams in an academic context.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
There is a major debate on the antecedents and consequences of various 
dimensions  (such  as  speed  or  comprehensiveness)  of  strategic  decision 
making (e.g. Baum & Wally, 2003; Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Forbes, 2005; Fredrickson, 1984; Hiller 
& Hambrick, 2005; Hough & White, 2003; Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 
1995; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Nutt, 1984). Key findings include the notion 
that the effect of strategic decision comprehensiveness on performance is 
moderated by the level and type of environmental uncertainty (Atuahene-
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Gima & Li, 2004; Fredrickson, 1984), that strategic decision making speed 
affects performance (Baum et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge & Miller, 
1991; Mintzberg et al., 1976), and that said speed is affected by individual 
characteristics of CEOs such as age, experience, cognitive ability (Forbes, 
2005; Wally & Baum, 1994) and by organizational characteristics such as 
centralization and formalization (Baum et al., 2003; Wally et al., 1994). 
In addition, a number of explorative studies has been done to enhance 
understanding of the processes of strategic decision making (Bourgeois & 
Eisenhardt,  1988;  Mintzberg  et  al.,  1976;  Nutt,  1984,  2002;  Papadakis, 
Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998; Rajagopalan, Rasheed, Datta, & Spreitzer, 1998; 
Roberto, 2004).
There is also a an extensive literature about the performance effects of 
group debate (Chapter 3; Barkema et al., 2007; Jehn et al., 2001; Postmes 
et al., 2001; Simons et al., 1999). However, there is no literature about the 
effects of debate on strategic-decision making. This is an important gap 
because an essential part of the process leading up to strategic decisions is 
the debate of reasons for and against decision options. Strategic decisions, 
i.e. commitments to action that are important in terms of the actions taken, 
resources committed or precedents set (Mintzberg et al., 1976), are sometimes 
made after extensive debate about the reasons for each decision option and 
sometimes without such debate or only little debate.  Another gap that we 
hope to fill is the lack of literature about the effects of group debate on 
the type of innovation adopted, specifically the extent to which adopted 
innovations are incremental vs. radical.
Our study aims to start filling these gaps by combining the insights of various 
strands of cognitive psychology literature on verbalization of reasons and the 
social psychology literature and applying these insights in the context of 
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strategic decisions about innovations. Specifically, our core insight is that 
debate may produce a bias to making strategic decisions in favor of adopting 
incremental innovations as opposed to radical innovations, and that this 
may especially be the case when team members have low ability to modify-
self presentation which makes the social setting cognitively taxing and is 
associated with low ability to express thoughts and feelings. This bias could 
result from verbal overshadowing, the phenomenon that verbalizing reasons 
leads to a bias towards choosing decision options that are supported by 
relatively easily verbalized reasons as opposed to decision options that are 
supported by relatively difficult to verbalize reasons (Fiore & Schooler, 2002; 
Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 1993; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 
1991). The reasons for why an incremental innovation is useful are usually 
easier to verbalize than those for a radical innovation (e.g. the characteristics 
of customers interested, the product value, the costs and the characteristics 
of competition are usually easier to verbalize for an incremental innovation 
than for a radical innovation), whereas the reasons against introducing any 
innovation are usually easy to verbalize (e.g. “there is no proven potential”). 
Hence, given verbal overshadowing, we theorize that verbalization of reasons 
will lead to a bias towards selecting incremental innovations over radical 
innovations, especially when team member’s average ability to modify self-
presentation is low. When such ability is high, we expect that group debate 
will make reasons for a radical innovation option more salient, and that such 
verbal activation will lead to a shift of support toward the radical innovation 
decision option. 
We use a randomized experiment (Aronson et al., 1998; Cook et al., 1979) 
with 39 real teams (178 individuals who have worked in these teams for   
2 months) at Tilburg University.
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Our findings are also valuable for practitioners. Our study suggests that when 
an organization creates a team that needs to make decisions about which 
innovation ideas to pursue (e.g. a steering committee taking decisions in 
the context of innovation pipeline management, or a research or NPD team, 
that in the course of its work decides to pursue certain innovation ideas and 
abandon others), management should pay attention, when selecting people 
for the team, to the ability of individuals to modify their self presentation. 
When the objective is to stimulate radical innovation, high ability is desired, 
when the objective is to stimulate incremental innovations, low ability to 
modify self-presentation is desired (assuming that these teams engage in 
debate before taking decisions). Alternatively, the team should be asked to 
make decisions without group debate preceding the decision, if a team is high 
on ability but incremental innovations are preferred by senior management or 
if a team is low in ability to modify self presentation but radical innovations 
are preferred by senior management. 
In  the  following  sections  we  first  provide  conceptual  background,  then 
develop our theory and hypotheses, subject these to a test, and discuss the 
results.
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4.2. CONCEPTUAL bACKGROUND
4.2.1. Verbalization
Group  debate  about  reasons  for  and  against  a  strategic  option  requires 
verbalization of reasons. The effect of verbalization is the focus of a number 
of distinct strands of cognitive psychology literature. To a large extent these 
strands in cognitive psychology have been developed in isolation of each 
other and their results are seemingly contradictory. We review these here.
The activation effect of verbalization
A stream of research has found that verbalization of reasons has a positive 
effect on the ability to solve complex problems, specifically ‘Tower of Hanoi’ 
problems. In such a problem, a set of discs needs to be moved from one circle 
to another of three circles in a number of moves and under certain move 
restrictions. Such studies have found that those individuals who are asked to 
verbalize reasons prior to each move need fewer moves to solve the problem 
than those not verbalizing reasons (Ahlum-Heath & Di Vesta, 1986; Bartl, 
2000; Bartl & Dorner, 1998; Berardicoletta, Dominowski, Buyer, & Rellinger, 
1995; Berteau, 1999; Davies, 2000; Dickson, McLennan, & Omodei, 2000; 
Gagne & Smith, 1962; Hacker & Wetzstein, 2004; Hussy, 1987; Stinessen, 
1985). 
Similar results were found with a different task by Berry and Broadbent 
(1984). In an experiment, participants repeatedly made staffing decisions for 
sugar plants in an attempt to manage the amount of sugar production. After 
having received verbal instruction informing participants of how staffing 
decisions influenced sugar production, those that verbalized reasons prior to 
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each staffing decision did much better at achieving the desired level of sugar 
production than those not verbalizing reasons. Explanations for the effect of 
verbalizing reasons include that individuals are stimulated to ‘stop and think’ 
(Gagne et al., 1962), and to keep attention focused on critical features of 
the decision (Berry et al., 1984). More generally, verbalizing reasons has an 
activating effect: it brings into consideration reasons that may not have been 
fully considered otherwise.
Another example of how verbalization has consequences due to the activating 
effect of verbalization is provided by the literature on self-explanations. In 
one study, Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu and LaVancher (1994) found that eighth grade 
students reading a passage on the human circulatory system and explaining 
out loud each sentence to themselves after reading it had greater pretest-
posttest gains in understanding and recall after 1 week than students who 
instead of self-explaining read each sentence a second time. Similarly, they 
found that students who explained to themselves aloud a set of worked out 
examples of applications of Newton’s laws developed a better understanding 
of cause-effect relationships covered by these laws than students who did 
not (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989).  The verbalizing of reasons 
(explanations) out loud had an activating effect, which enhanced recall.
Another example of the activating effect of verbalization is the articulatory 
loop. Baddeley found that when individuals orally verbalize, their (short term) 
working memory is enhanced, e.g. those stating a phone number out loud 
remember it better shortly thereafter than those who try to memorize the 
number without orally verbalizing it. This is called the articulatory loop, in 
which information is temporarily held (Baddeley, 1999). Verbalizing activates 
the verbalized information and this affects short term recall.
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The overshadowing effect of verbalization
There is another extensive stream of research, led by Schooler and colleagues 
(Fiore et al., 2002; Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 1993; Wilson et al., 1993; 
Wilson et al., 1991), that finds that in certain conditions verbalization has 
negative effects on cognitive performance. This negative effect is the result of 
‘verbal overshadowing’, i.e. a bias towards more easily verbalizable thoughts. 
For example, non-expert individuals who are asked to decide which jams they 
consider highest quality and who verbalize the reasons prior to giving the 
ratings deviate more from expert ratings than individuals who rate without 
verbalizing  reasons  (Wilson  et  al.,  1991).  Another  example  is  that  when 
witnesses of a crime provide a verbal description of the perpetrator they make 
fewer correct identifications of the perpetrator from photospreads, compared 
with witnesses who do not verbalize  (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). 
A last example is the selection of college courses: students were provided 
with information about college courses in the upcoming period and those 
who verbalized the reasons for how they felt about each course were less 
likely in that next course period to enrol in courses that were rated highly by 
students who had already taken the course (Wilson et al., 1991). Logically, 
bias in decision-making due to verbal overshadowing can only occur when, 
first, there is variance in the ease of verbalization of reasons, i.e. when some 
knowledge is more easily verbalizable than other knowledge, and, second, 
when the less easily verbalizable reasons and the more easily verbalizable 
reasons have contrary implications for which decision is to be taken. This 
seems to be the case in the context of radical and incremental innovations, 
as we will discuss further in our theory and hypotheses section.
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4.2.2. Group debate
Laughlin and colleagues (2006; 2003) found that debate by a group of 
individuals leads to better performance than the best individual could have 
achieved alone, on intellective tasks where there is a demonstrably correct 
answer. Laughlin and colleagues explained that on these intellective tasks 
team members in group debate each offered ideas towards the solution and 
that teams, given the demonstrability of the solution, could evaluate the 
merits of each idea. By taking the best ideas of each team member the group 
was able to achieve a higher performance than any of the individuals could 
have reached. This is in an interesting finding, and it begs the question what 
the effect is of group debate when there is no demonstrably correct solution, 
and hence the team cannot easily evaluate the merits of each individual 
contribution, as is the case in making a strategic choice to pursue a specific 
innovation. 
4.2.3. Ability to modify self presentation
A group setting is a social setting and in group debate individuals need to 
consciously be sensitive to expressive behavior of others, e.g. in response 
to the individual’s statements, and need to continuously adapt their self-
presentation given the responses of others. Such monitoring and adapting 
self-presentation  pose  a  cognitive  load.  Work  by  Snyder  and  colleagues 
(Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) has shown that in social settings 
individuals chronically differ in their ability to modify their self-presentation 
(Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). Whereas some individuals have strong ability to 
modify  their  self-presentation,  other  individuals  have  greater  difficulty 
modifying self-presentation. For individuals with high ability, the cognitive 
load from having to adapt one’s self-presentation is lower than for individuals 
Dissertation_rotis Serif_SW.indd60   60 07.08.2007   9:43:42 Uhr61
with  low  ability  (Chapter  2).  The  ability  to  modify  self-presentation,  is 
theoretically and empirically a distinct component of self-monitoring, e.g. 
distinct from the sensitivity to expression of others (see e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 
1988; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Miller & Thayer, 1989).    
Self-presentation can be either verbal or nonverbal or a combination thereof 
(Snyder, 1974).  Underlying the ability to modify self-presentation is the 
ability  to  effectively  present  one’s  own  thoughts  and  feelings  in  group 
discussion, be it verbally or nonverbally (Lennox et al., 1984; Snyder, 1974). 
This is a relevant personality trait in the context of verbalization: when 
in group discussion certain thoughts and feelings are difficult to present 
verbally, the ability to effectively express such thoughts and feelings may 
play an important role. 
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4.3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
As discussed above, when reasons are verbalized what is verbalized depends 
on the ease of verbalization: reasons that are more difficult to verbalize 
are  less  likely  to  be  verbalized  than  reasons  that  are  easier  to  verbalize 
(overshadowing effect). In addition, whatever is verbalized is made more 
salient (activating effect). Hence, when the reasons in favor of a decision 
option A are relatively difficult to verbalize, and the reasons in favor of 
another decision option B are relatively easy to verbalize, we expect that 
verbalization will make the reasons in favor of option B more salient than 
those for option A. This seems relevant in the context of innovation: we 
focus on the decision to advance a radical innovation, i.e. an innovation 
that is based on a new set of engineering and scientific principles and often 
opens up whole new markets and potential applications (Henderson et al., 
1990),  or  an  incremental  innovation,  i.e.  an  innovation  that  introduces 
relatively minor changes to the existing product, to the market launch stage. 
The reasons why a radical innovation may be useful are relatively difficult 
to verbalize: not much is known about future buyers, competitors, prices, 
costs and hence profitability (Christensen et al., 1996). The reasons why 
an incremental innovation is useful are, in comparison, relatively easy to 
verbalize: buyers, competitors, prices, costs and hence profitability are more 
concretely understood. For example, when Sony first launched the Walkman, 
it was clearly new, but it was difficult to verbalize the reasons why this 
innovation was useful. It was difficult to be explicit about how the Walkman 
would be useful to consumers and to Sony (e.g. in terms of sales, profitability, 
reputation, etc). In contrast, when Sony later launched new versions of the 
Walkman, incremental innovations, it could verbalize much more lucidly 
why these innovations were useful to typical Walkman users and to Sony. 
Given this difference in how easily reasons in favor of an incremental vs. a 
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radical innovation are verbalized, and given that easily verbalized reasons 
gain more salience as opposed to less easily verbalized reasons (as verbal 
overshadowing studies at the individual level of analysis have suggested), 
we predict that group debate about an incremental vs. radical innovation 
will lead to a bias towards deciding in favor of the incremental innovation: 
the reasons in support of the incremental innovation are easily verbalized 
and are made more salient by the verbalization, whereas those in support of 
the radical innovation are not so easily verbalized and thus do not become 
similarly salient. Because reasons that are easily verbalized are more likely 
to be discussed in group debate than reasons that are relatively difficult 
to verbalize and because reasons in favor of a radical innovation are more 
difficult to verbalize than reasons in favor of an incremental innovation and 
are more difficult to verbalize than reasons against a radical innovation, 
group debate will reduce the likelihood of the group deciding in favor of a 
radical innovation. 
H1.   At the group level of analysis, group debate about a decision to 
invest in an incremental or radical innovation will lead to a bias 
towards the incremental innovation option, in comparison with 
making the decision without prior group debate.
A group setting is a social setting and in group debate individuals need 
to continuously monitor the expressive behavior of others and to adapt 
one’s self-presentation accordingly. Especially when an individual’s ability 
to modify self-presentation is low, the need to monitor and adapt one’s self 
presentation accordingly provides a substantial cognitive load, leaving less 
cognitive capacity available for other tasks (Chapter 2). In addition, underlying 
the ability to modify self-presentation is the ability to effectively present one’s 
own thoughts and feelings in group discussion, be it verbally or nonverbally 
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(Lennox et al., 1984; Snyder, 1974). Combining these points we suggest that 
individuals with low ability to modify self-presentation, have relatively little 
cognitive capacity available for expressing reasons in favor of an innovation 
(because the social setting demands a cognitive load), and have a relatively 
low ability to express difficult to verbalize reasons, which makes it relatively 
unlikely that they will express reasons in favor of a radical innovation well, 
given that in particular reasons in favor of a radical innovation are difficult to 
express, compared to reasons in favor of an incremental innovation option. 
Expressing reasons in favour of an incremental innovation option is relatively 
easy and requires little cognitive capacity, and hence is less challenging for 
those with low ability to modify self presentation than expressing reasons in 
favor of a radical innovation.
When groups start a discussion about two decision options such as adopting 
an incremental or a radical innovation, there is some variance in the initial 
opinions (Isenberg, 1986), i.e. some individuals have an initial opinion in 
favor of the incremental option, others in favor of the radical innovation 
option. When a group engages in debate, individuals express their thoughts 
supporting their initially preferred decision option and are critized by others 
(Simons et al., 1999). When average ability to modify self-presentation is 
low, those initially in favor of the radical innovation option do not have the 
capacity and ability to express the reasons in favor of the radical innovation 
well and the debate in the group will center on the reasons in favor of the 
incremental innovation, as these are easy to express and hence require little 
capacity and ability to express. In such a setting, it is unlikely that those 
initially in favor of the initial innovation would change their preference, 
whereas those initially in favor of the radical innovation are likely to change 
their preference due to the emphasis of the group debate on the incremental 
innovation, and their inability to express appropriately the reasons for the 
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radical innovation, as a result of which the preference for the radical innovation 
becomes less tenable. When a few team members shift their opinion from 
radical to incremental innovation, it becomes more likely that the group 
will decide in favor of the incremental innovation. In sum, we expect that 
especially if ability to modify self-presentation is low, verbal overshadowing 
will occur and debate will lead to a shift towards incremental innovations.
When average ability to modify self-presentation is high in a team, the 
individuals need relatively little cognitive capacity for monitoring and adapting 
accordingly to the social setting and have high ability to express thoughts 
and feelings. When groups engage in debate about innovations and average 
ability to modify self-presentation is high, the members with an initial opinion 
in favor of a radical innovation are likely to effectively express the reasons 
in favor of the radical innovation, that tend to be difficult to express. This 
leads to greater salience of these reasons than without debate, and may sway 
some of those with an initial opinion in favor of an incremental innovation 
towards the radical innovation. As a result, when average ability to modify 
self-presentation is high, debate increases the likelihood that teams choose a 
radical innovation. In this case, it is not verbal overshadowing of the reasons 
for the radical innovation by the reasons for the incremental innovation, but 
increased verbal activation of the reasons in favor of the radical innovation 
that explains the effect of debate on the type of innovation chosen. 
H2.   At the group level of analysis, the effect of group debate on the 
innovation decision (incremental vs. radical) taken is affected by 
the average ability to modify self-presentation; when average 
ability  to  modify  self  presentation  is  low,  group  debate  will 
shift the decision towards the incremental innovation (verbal 
overshadowing), when average ability is high, group debate will 
shift the decision towards the radical option (verbal activation). 
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4.4. METHOD
4.4.1. Design
We conducted a randomized experiment in which real teams were given 
information about two product proposals: one incremental innovation (a 
storage capacity extension for a USB stick) and one radical innovation (a USB 
stick not requiring plugging-in, i.e. wireless). The conditions were: I. Group 
decision-making without debate (immediate anonymous voting), II. Group 
decision making with prior group debate. To test hypothesis 1 and 2, we first 
aggregated the decisions of individuals in the no-debate condition to group 
decisions: we counted the decisions by individual team members in favor of 
the incremental and those in favor of the radical innovation and determined 
the group decision based on whichever decision received the majority based 
on the individual decisions (there were no ties). We then compared these 
group decisions with the decisions made by the teams in the group debate 
condition, who differed only in that they had group debate prior to taking 
the decision as a team. 
We used a randomized experiment rather than observations or a survey, 
because 1) when manipulation of conditions and randomisation are possible, 
experiments  offer  compelling  advantages  in  terms  of  internal  validity 
(inferences  regarding  causality),  and  because  2)  we  wanted  to  keep  the 
decision options and information provided constant in order to enhance 
statistical validity (Aronson et al., 1998; Cook et al., 1979).
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4.4.2. Sample
The sample consisted of 39 real teams of 4-5 students formed during a 12-
week business simulation course, with 178 last-year bachelor students in 
total who took part for course credit. These students were knowledgeable 
about USB sticks, and hence had the knowledge required to perform the 
experimental  task.  The  experiment  took  place  after  the  teams  had  two 
months of experience working together as a team; as a result the teams are 
real teams, not ad-hoc created teams, which serves to enhance the external 
validity of our findings. Teams were randomly allocated to the two: 19 teams 
(86 individuals) to condition I, 20 teams (92 individuals) to condition II. 
4.4.3. Procedure
In the first week of the business simulation course, all participants completed 
a short survey to capture informational diversity and ability to modify self-
presentation. Roughly 2 months later, participants took part in the experiment 
one team at a time. The experimenter handed out a sheet of information 
that  explained  that  the  R&D  department  of  the  (in  actuality  fictitious) 
company Memory International (in the competitive business of producing 
and selling USB sticks) had come up with two new product proposals. One 
proposal was a new design memory stick that was wireless but had only 
half the storage capacity of existing USB sticks. This is a radical innovation 
(although not identified as such to participants), in accordance with the 
definition of radical innovation quoted from Henderson and Clark (1990), 
given that it would require a new set of engineering and scientific principles 
(e.g. new product components are included such as a wireless connection 
device, whereas others can be removed, e.g. a USB connection and the cap, 
the architecture of the stick can also change, i.e. it does not need to be a 
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“stick”, and finally it also opens up new potential applications and markets, 
e.g. ability to easily allow people at meetings to easily access key files on 
other’s USB sticks, etc. etc.). Another proposal was a significant expansion 
of the storage capacity of the existing USB sticks. This was the incremental 
innovation option (although not identified as such to participants), given 
that the product changes are relatively minor: no new types of components, 
no change to the design, no changes in applications and markets foreseaable. 
In addition, background information was provided:
“  Product developers think that no longer having to plug in a memory 
stick has many possible applications, but they cannot yet articulate 
which ones. Also computer experts think that this product feature 
has a lot of potential. In market research, 80% of customers say that 
increasing memory capacity is the most important improvement in 
USB sticks that they desire. They say that memory capacity is the 
most important factor in the decision for buying a specific brand 
USB stick.” 
The concrete reasons suggesting that the incremental innovation is useful 
were easy to verbalize (as they were clearly specified), whereas the reasons 
suggesting that the radical innovation is useful were less easy to verbalize 
(unclear which customers are interested, for which applications etc). This 
is a very typical and realistic situation: knowledge about the benefits and 
downsides of an incremental innovation and about the downsides of a radical 
innovation is usually high and hence such benefits and downsides are easy 
to verbalize, whereas knowledge about the benefits of a radical innovation is 
more limited upfront, and hence more difficult to verbalize ex-ante. Not only 
is this setting highly typical for innovation, it is also a very similar setting 
to the case of jams and college courses used in previous studies of verbal 
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overshadowing (Wilson et al., 1991): e.g. in the jam case some reasons were 
easy to verbalize (such as the number of strawberry chunks in the jam) and 
others were more difficult to verbalize (such as characteristics of the texture 
of the jam).
In condition I (no debate) team members were then asked to make a decision 
for one of the two options individually, i.e. without discussing with other 
team members. In condition II (group debate), teams were asked to debate 
the reasons for each decision option during 10 minutes. After 10 minutes 
of discussion, the groups in this condition were asked to make and record a 
decision for either the incremental or radical innovation. Thereafter students 
were debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
4.4.4. Analysis
We  tested  hypothesis  1  and  2  with  probit  and  logit  regression  of  the 
innovation option chosen on the condition, including controls for the level of 
informational diversity because there is a stream of literature that argues that 
in the context of debate diversity leads to more innovative decisions (Bantel 
& Jackson, 1989; Barkema & Chvyrkov, 2007; Boeker, 1997; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992). To control for this we include a variable capturing the level of 
informational diversity and an interaction term of the condition (debate/no 
debate) and the level of informational diversity (because diversity is likely to 
only have an impact on the innovation decision in the condition of debate, 
and not in the condition of no debate).
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4.4.5. Measures
Ability to modify self presentation was measured using the Lennox & Wolfe 
(1984) 13-item Revised Self-Monitoring scale, more specifically its Dutch 
version, as first used in an empirical study by De Vet and De Dreu (Chapter 
2). This Dutch version was developed by Steinel and has good psychometric 
qualities (Steinel, 2004). Examples of items in the scale are (a) I have the 
ability  to  control  the  way  I  come  across  to  people,  depending  on  the 
impression I wish to give them; (b) When I feel that the image I am portraying 
isn’t working, I can readily change to something that does; and (c) Once I 
know what the situation calls for, it’s easy for me to regulate my actions 
accordingly. Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation showed 
that the 13 items loaded on two factors as expected, and within scales 
ratings for the first factor were averaged into an index for “self-monitoring 
ability” (the second factor reflected “sensitivity to expression of others”). 
Cronbach alpha was 0.7.
Informational  diversity  was  proxied  by  educational  diversity,  which  we 
measured by asking participants to indicate the electives they have taken during 
their studies. These electives were part of accounting, finance, marketing or 
organization study tracks. Students tend to take many electives in one track, 
and some outside this focus. We counted the number of electives in each 
track taken by each student and identified the primary study focus of each 
student by identifying the track in which the most electives had been taken. 
As is common practice when a diversity measure is based on categorical data, 
we then estimated the informational diversity of the group by calculating a 
Blau’s index (Blau, 1977) based on the number of team members in each 
focus area (accounting, marketing, finance, organization).
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4.5. RESULTS
To  test  hypothesis  1,  we  compared  the  choices  made  by  the  teams  in 
condition I (no group debate) and those made by teams in condition II 
(group debate). We ran probit and logit regressions of the choice made by 
the team on the debate condition. Results were opposite to our hypothesis, 
i.e. groups debating were more likely to adopt the radical innovation (as 
opposed to the incremental innovation) than groups not debating: t-statistic 
–2.08 and –1.98 for probit and logit regressions respectively (two-tailed 
p<0.04 and p<0.05 respectively, n=39). The share of teams adopting the 
radical innovation option was 11% in the no-debate condition, and 40% in 
the debate condition.
However, because there is a literature suggesting that task-relevant diversity 
in teams may lead to more innovation (see earlier), we felt we had to control 
for diversity. So, we ran probit and logit regressions of the innovation choice 
made on the debate condition, the level of informational diversity (measured 
as diversity in educational focus), and an interaction for diversity and debate 
to control for the effect of diversity on innovation in the debate condition. 
We did not centralize diversity in the interaction term (Aiken et al., 1991), 
because we wanted the coefficient for the main effect of debate to reflect the 
effect of debate in the case of no diversity (and we did have teams with no 
diversity in the sample), so that we could make strong claims that any effect 
that we found for debate could not be attributable to the fact that (even at 
lower levels of diversity) diversity has been found to lead to innovation. 
After thus controlling for informational diversity, the effect of group debate 
was no longer significant. See table 4.1 for descriptives and table 4.2 for 
results of the probit regression. Logit results were similar.
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Table 4.1
Descriptives and zero-order correlations (n=39)
M SD 1 2 3 4
Innovation decision   0.74 0.44 1
Group debate   0.51 0.51   –.34** 1
Diversity   0.43 0.21   0.08   –0.05   1
Ability to modify 24.59 1.26   –0.16   –0.06  –0.08 1
** two-tailed p<0.05
Table 4.2 
Results group-level probit regression (n=39)
     B SE T
Intercept                   0.85      0.68   1.24
Debate (yes/no)   –0.29   1.03   –0.28
Diversity                    1.00   1.45   0.69
Diversity*Debate     –1.73   2.21   –0.78
Dependent: innovation decision (0: radical, 1: incremental)
To test hypothesis 2, we ran probit and logit regressions of the choice made 
on the condition (group debate/no group debate), the average ability to 
modify self-presentation of team members and an interaction for ability 
to modify self-presentation and debate. We also included as independents 
the  level  of  informational  diversity  and  an  interaction  for  diversity  and 
debate, to control for the effect of diversity on innovation in the debate 
condition. Following the suggestion of Aiken and West (Aiken et al., 1991) 
we centralized ability to modify self presentation in the interaction term.   
This  was  appropriate  as  we  were  interested  in  understanding  the  main 
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effect of debate at the average level of ability to modify self presentation 
and because not centralizing would indicate the main effect of debate at 
zero ability to modify self presentation. Because we did not actually have 
any teams with zero ability to modify self-presentation in the sample, and 
because there is no prior literature suggesting that there is a main effect of 
ability to modify self presentation on innovation in debate, we did centralize. 
However, we did not do so for informational diversity in its interaction with 
debate, with good reason, as explained above.
We found, as predicted, that the interaction of the average ability to modify 
self presentation and debate was significant, in the direction predicted (probit 
t = –1.76, p<0.08 two-sided, p<0.04 one-sided; logit t = –1.61, p<0.10 two-
sided, p<0.05 one-sided). It is surprising to find these levels of significance for 
an interaction term with such a small sample size (n=39 in this comparison). 
The coefficients of debate, diversity, the interaction of diversity with debate, 
or the ability to modify self presentation were not significant. 
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Table 4.3 
Results group-level probit regression (n=39)
     B SE T
Intercept                   –5.50 9.36   –0.59
Debate                   –0.05 1.17   –0.05
Diversity                    1.47           1.71   0.86
Diversity*Debate.     –2.59 2.61   –0.99
Ability to modify          0.25 0.37   0.68
Ability* Debate.        –0.85  0.48   –1.76**
** p<0.05 one-sided
Dependent: innovation decision (0: radical, 1: incremental).
The interpretation of the interaction term is as predicted: the higher the 
average ability to modify self-presentation of a team the more positive the 
impact of debate is on the likelihood of choosing the radical innovation. For 
teams with relatively low ability to modify self-presentation (one standard 
deviation below the mean), group debate leads to verbal overshadowing 
and teams are less likely to choose the radical innovation (8% probability 
of choosing the radical innovation) than had they not engaged in debate 
(35%). For teams with relatively high ability to modify self-presentation, 
debate leads to verbal activation and the likelihood of adopting the radical 
innovation is higher with debate (54%) than without debate (15%); all these 
reported probabilities are calculated at zero diversity, because we want to 
completely abstract from known effects of diversity on innovation. See figure 
4.1. This pattern of findings supports our hypothesis 2.
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    Low ability to modify self-presentation low (–1)
  High ability to modify self-presentation high (+1)
75
Figure 4.1 
Interaction Group debate – Ability to modify self-presentation (at zero 
diversity)
4.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We have used the cognitive psychology literature on verbalization and the 
social psychology literature on ability to modify self-presentation to shed 
light on a debate in the management literature about the effects of group 
debate on strategic decision-making about innovation, in particular decisions 
to adopt incremental vs. radical innovations. 
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We argued that debate about reasons for an innovation can lead to verbal 
overshadowing, but that this may only occur when the average level of 
ability to modify self-presentation is low, and that when it is high, not verbal 
overshadowing but verbal activation may prevail. When ability is low, team 
members initially in favor of a radical innovation do not have the capacity 
or ability to express the reasons in favor of the radical innovation, whereas 
those in favor of an incremental innovation do, driven by the phenomenon 
that reasons in favor of an incremental innovation require little capacity or 
ability to express. When ability is high, team members initially in favor of 
a radical innovation do have the capacity and ability to express reasons in 
favor of the radical innovation and their doing so makes these reasons more 
cognitively accessible, more salient, more activated, which may sway some 
of those initially in favor of the incremental innovation towards supporting 
the radical option.  
We find no main effect of group debate on innovation, but do find support 
for the idea that for teams with relatively low ability to modify self-presentation 
(e.g. one standard deviation below the mean), group debate leads to verbal 
overshadowing and hence the likelihood to choose a radical innovation is 
relatively low (8%) compared with teams who do engage in debate (35%). 
However, for teams with relatively high ability to modify self-presentation, 
group debate does seem to lead to verbal activation: the likelihood to adopt 
the radical innovation is 15% without debate, and 54% with debate. 
We have enriched the literature about group debate and strategic decision-
making, in particular by focusing on the effects of group debate on strategic 
decision-making about innovation, i.e. the effect of group debate on strategic 
innovation decisions. We have combined cognitive psychology literature (on 
verbalization overshadowing and verbal activation) and social psychology 
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literature (on ability to modify self-presentation) to predict when debate 
leads to decision shifts towards a radical innovation and when to shifts 
towards an incremental innovation. 
Our findings are also valuable for practitioners. Our study suggests that when 
an organization creates a team that needs to make decisions about which 
innovation ideas to pursue (e.g. a steering committee taking decisions in 
the context of innovation pipeline management, or a research or NPD team, 
that in the course of its work decides to pursue certain innovation ideas and 
abandon others), management should pay attention, when selecting people 
for the team, to the ability of individuals to modify their self presentation. 
When the objective is to stimulate radical innovation, high ability is desired, 
when the objective is to stimulate incremental innovations, low ability to 
modify self-presentation is desired (assuming that these teams engage in 
debate before taking decisions). Alternatively, the team should be asked to 
make decisions without group debate preceding the decision, if a team is high 
on ability but incremental innovations are preferred by senior management or 
if a team is low in ability to modify self presentation but radical innovations 
are preferred by senior management. 
Future research could test our theory in a business setting, and could for 
example extend our theory by studying the effect of the amount of time 
elapsed between debate (e.g.. about pros and cons for each decision option) 
and the moment the decision is taken. It may be that increases in the length 
of such a time intermezzo between debate and the decision reduces the 
effects of verbal overshadowing (when ability to modify self presentation 
is low), whereas the effects of verbal activation (when ability to modify 
self presentation is high) of reasons in favor of a radical innovation are 
not reduced by time. Studying the effect of the amount of time elapsed 
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between debate and the moment the decision is taken is especially relevant 
in a realistic, business setting, as in practice there is a natural succession of 
group and individual work, which can hardly be prevented. Hence, to make 
the findings directly applicable we need to study not whether debate took 
place (it will always have), but whether debate took place in a certain time 
period before the decision.
To strengthen the findings, it would also be worthwhile in a next study to 
test directly the assumption that individuals with high ability to modify self-
presentation have relatively little difficulty expressing difficult to verbalize 
thoughts and feelings, and it would be desirable to have a larger sample so 
that the significance of the two slope coefficients constituting the interaction 
of debate and ability to modify self-presentation can be tested. Finally, it 
would be more realistic if in condition I (no group debate) the team itself 
comes to a decision without group debate (e.g. by voting with show of 
hands, or anonymous voting), rather than that the experimenters determine 
the group decision in this condition by counting the votes of team members 
and implying a group decision from the majority vote.
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CHAPTER 5  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is generally acknowledged that in order to sustain and enhance performance, 
firms need innovation. Innovation allows companies to grow, to win in the 
competitive race, and to make high profits, and it allows societies composed 
of innovating companies to enjoy high employment levels, high wages, and 
high standards of living.
There is a substantial amount of research on innovation. First, of all there 
is a lot of research at the firm level of analysis, e.g. regarding patterns in 
R&D  expenditures,  threats  of  innovation  to  incumbents,  exploration  vs 
exploitation, market orientation, and alliances of a firm. 
However, not only the firm level of analysis can shed light on factors that 
affect firm innovation. Innovation by firms is a product of individuals and 
teams working together. Innovation is essentially a product of useful new 
ideas. Such ideas are first generated by an individual or a team and are then 
adopted and institutionalized by the firm (Crossan et al., 1999).  Innovation 
performance by a firm is hence clearly dependent on generation of useful 
novel ideas (creativity) and the selection of useful novel ideas (decision-
making)  by  individuals  and  teams.  This  dissertation  focused  on  exactly 
that: the generation and selection of useful novel ideas by individuals and   
teams. 
In terms of the factors that affect creativity and decision-making in the 
context  of  innovation,  I  focused  on  thinking  in  silence,  as  opposed  to 
thinking aloud at the individual level of analysis, and as opposed to group 
debate at the group level of analysis.
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There is a number of streams of literature on the effects of thinking in 
silence on cognitive performance (see chapters 2, 3, and 4 for reviews). 
Some streams suggest these effects are positive (e.g. verbal overshadowing, 
production blocking), some suggest these are negative (e.g. verbal activation). 
The literature on the effects of thinking in silence on innovation is filled with 
important gaps which I have defined precisely in chapters 2-4. 
In chapter 2, we found that the effect of thinking in silence on individual 
creativity depends on self-monitoring characteristics of the individual. When 
the ability to modify self presentation is low and the sensitivity to expressive 
behaviour of others is high, thinking in silence has a notably positive impact 
on individual creativity, in comparison with thinking aloud. Otherwise, there 
is no impact on individual creativity. Or in other words, when thinking aloud 
(but not when thinking in silence), sensitivity to the expression of others only 
negatively affects creative ideation when ability to modify self-presentation 
is low. This finding is important because it suggests that constructs such as 
sensitivity to others, social anxiousness and evaluation apprehension impact 
creative ideation especially when people have difficulty adapting, and not 
when people easily adapt to others. This is an important contribution to 
the literature so far, that did not distinguish between the effects of these 
two parts of self-monitoring (sensitivity to others and ability to adapt) on 
creative ideation.
In chapter 3, I took the study of the effect of thinking in silence on idea 
generation to the group level of analysis, and hence focused on the effect on 
creativity (which is an important input for innovation) of thinking in silence 
versus group debate. The underlying assumption in reviewed management 
literature is that group debate is more effective for innovation than individuals 
thinking alone. I challenge that belief: I found in chapter 3 that suspending 
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group debate (temporarily) can be productive for innovation, when at least 
one group member has relatively low extraversion. Holding a (5 minute) 
intermezzo for thinking alone, following a phase of initial group debate 
to  share  information  and  perspectives  on  the  problem  under  discussion, 
and followed by further group debate, has a major positive effect on the 
number of ideas generated by a group (without negatively affecting quality 
of the ideas), unless all members of the group are relatively extraverted. 
The moderating effect of extraversion is understandable: individuals who 
are relatively introverted are relatively less able to multitask (Lieberman et 
al., 2001). Group problem-solving does require multitasking: listening to the 
ideas of others, monitoring the discussion to determine when to speak up, 
remembering own ideas generated, and generating new ideas. Those who 
are less able to multitask (the introverts), benefit a lot from a temporary 
relief from all those demands on cognitive capacity, and this explains why an 
intermezzo for thinking in silence helps especially when one or more team 
members is relatively introverted.
The managerial implications are clear and can easily be put into practice: 
use a short (e.g. 5 minute) intermezzo for thinking in silence during group 
problem-solving meetings, especially if there is a need to generate more ideas 
and if at least one of the team members is relatively introverted. 
In chapter 4, I shifted the focus from generation of ideas to selection of 
ideas, at the group level of analysis. I focused on strategic decisions, i.e. 
decisions  to  adopt  incremental  or  more  radical  innovations  for  market 
launch. Although group debate and strategic decision-making have both 
been extensively studied in the literature, there has been a lack of research 
on the effect of group debate on strategic decision-making in the context of 
innovation. In chapter 4, I started filling this gap with a study on the effect 
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of group debate vs. thinking in silence on the type of innovation selected (in 
casu, radical versus incremental innovation). I found that this effect depends 
on group members’ average ability to modify self presentation. When ability 
to modify self-presentation is high, group debate leads to more decisions in 
favor of a radical innovation as compared with no group debate (individuals 
think and decide in silence and group decision is based on majority vote). 
When ability to modify self-presentation is low, group debate leads to more 
decisions in favor of an incremental innovation as compared with no group 
debate. We predict and explain this finding relying on distinct streams of 
literature on verbal overshadowing and on verbal activation, that have till 
now not been combined in one study. 
When average ability to modify self-presentation is low, those initially in 
favor of the radical innovation option do not have the capacity and ability to 
express the reasons in favor of the radical innovation well and the debate in 
the group will center on the reasons in favor of the incremental innovation, 
as these are easy to express and hence require little capacity and ability to 
express. In such a setting, it is unlikely that those initially in favor of the 
incremental innovation would change their preference, whereas those initially 
in favor of the radical innovation are likely to change their preference due to 
the emphasis of the group debate on the incremental innovation, and their 
inability to express appropriately the reasons for the radical innovation, as a 
result of which the preference for the radical innovation becomes less tenable. 
When a few team members shift their opinion from radical to incremental 
innovation, it becomes more likely that the group will decide in favor of the 
incremental innovation. In sum, we expect that especially if ability to modify 
self-presentation is low, verbal overshadowing will occur and debate will lead 
to a shift towards incremental innovations.
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When average ability to modify self-presentation is high in a team, the 
individuals need relatively little cognitive capacity for monitoring and adapting 
accordingly to the social setting and have high ability to express thoughts 
and feelings. When groups engage in debate about innovations and average 
ability to modify self-presentation is high, the members with an initial opinion 
in favor of a radical innovation are likely to effectively express the reasons 
in favor of the radical innovation, that tend to be difficult to express. This 
leads to greater salience of these reasons than without debate, and may sway 
some of those with an initial opinion in favor of an incremental innovation 
towards the radical innovation. As a result, when average ability to modify 
self-presentation is high, debate increases the likelihood that teams choose a 
radical innovation. In this case, it is not verbal overshadowing of the reasons 
for the radical innovation by the reasons for the incremental innovation, but 
increased verbal activation of the reasons in favor of the radical innovation 
that explains the effect of debate on the type of innovation chosen
Summing  up  all  these  studies,  I  suggest  that,  under  certain  conditions, 
thinking  in  silence  can  positively  affect  individual  and  group  creativity 
and can affect the types of innovation ideas selected by a decision-making 
group. 
Many  interesting  questions  for  future  research  remain.  First  it  would 
be interesting to study whether the effect of the interaction of ability to 
modify self presentation and sensitivity to expressive behaviour of others on 
creativity, that we found in chapter 2 at the individual level of analysis, can 
also be found at the group level of analysis and whether the effect depends 
on the size of the group given that the size of the group increases the need 
to process information expressed by others which is more relevant for those 
high in sensitivity to expressive behaviour of others. 
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Second, regarding chapter 3, it would be interesting to study the effect of 
the length of the intermezzo for thinking in silence during group debate on 
group creativity and to study the effect of the starting time of the intermezzo 
(e.g. at the very beginning, shortly after the start, at the midpoint, close to 
the end) on group creativity. More generally it would be valuable to study the 
effect of an intermezzo in a different setting, e.g. with teams of managers 
in organizations.
Third, it would be interesting to study whether the effect of extraversion on 
the effect of the intermezzo on team creativity is linear. This would require a 
larger sample than in our study.
Fourth, it would be interesting to investigate whether an intermezzo for 
thinking alone during group debate (chapter 3) affects decision-making by 
the group as much as completely thinking in silence does (as investigated in 
chapter 4). 
Finally, chapter 4 could also be repeated but now at the individual level 
instead of the group level of analysis. In other words does thinking in silence 
affects the type of innovation adopted, at the individual level of analysis?
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)
Het wordt algemeen erkend dat innovatie van doorslaggevend belang is 
voor het verbeteren van de resultaten van een onderneming. Het verbaast 
derhalve ook niet dat er op het gebied van innovatie een grote hoeveelheid 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek plaats vindt. Er is veel onderzoek op het analyse 
niveau van een organisatie, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot patronen in 
R&D investeringen, de bedreigingen die van bepaalde vormen van innovatie 
uitgaan jegens gevestigde ondernemingen, exploratie versus exploitatie, de 
(soms ongewenste) effecten van markt oriëntatie, en allerlei aspecten van 
alliantievorming door een firma.
Echter, ook het niveau van het individu of de groep is interessant voor 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar innovatie. Tenslotte is innovatie het product 
van nieuwe nuttige ideeën. Zulke ideeën worden initieel gegenereerd door een 
individu of team en worden vervolgens geadopteerd en geïnstitutionaliseerd 
in een organisatie (Crossan et al., 1999). De innovatie prestatie van een 
onderneming is dus duidelijk afhankelijk van de ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
nuttige ideeën en de selectie van de beste daarvan, door individuen en 
teams. Deze dissertatie richt zich precies daarop: de ontwikkeling en selectie 
van nieuwe nuttige ideeën door individuen en teams.
Wat betreft de antecedenten, d.w.z. de factoren die de ontwikkeling en 
selectie van nieuwe nuttige ideeën beinvloeden, richt ik me op stilzwijgend 
denken, in vergelijking met hardop denken (op het niveau van het individu) 
en in vergelijking met debat (op het niveau van de groep). 
Er is een aantal stromingen in de literatuur over de effecten van stilzwijgend   
denken  op  cognitieve  prestatie  (zie  hoofdstukken  2,  3,  en  4  voor  een 
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bespreking  van  deze  stromingen).  Sommige  studies  suggereren  dat  deze 
effecten positief zijn, andere dat ze negatief zijn. In de hoofdstukken 2, 3, 
en 4 lever ik een bijdrage aan deze discussie.
In de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 2 suggereren we dat het effect van 
stilzwijgend denken op individuele creativiteit afhangt van bepaalde individuele 
kenmerken op het gebied van ‚self-monitoring’. Stilzwijgend denken heeft 
in vergelijking met hardop denken een sterk positief effect of individuele 
creativiteit, als iemand niet goed in staat is om zijn eigen presentatie jegens 
anderen aan te passen en relatief gevoelig is voor uitdrukkingen van anderen. 
Dit is een belangrijke bijdrage aan de literatuur, die tot nu toe geen rekening 
hield met de distinctie en de interactie tussen deze twee eigenschappen in 
hun effect op creativiteit.
In de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 3, bestudeer ik dezelfde causale relatie 
als in hoofdstuk 2, maar nu niet op het niveau van het individu, maar 
dat van de groep. De vraag is wat het effect is van het houden van een 
kort intermezzo voor stilzwijgend denken tijdens een vergadering, op de 
creativiteit van de groep. De veronderstelling van de meeste management 
literatuur en van managers zelf is dat groepsdiscussie beter is voor innovatie 
dan individueel denken. Ik ontwikkel in dit proefschrift theorie om uit te 
leggen waarom dat een misleidende veronderstelling is. Ik beredeneer en 
vind in deze studie empirische ondersteuning voor de stelling dat het tijdelijk 
stoppen van de groepsdiscussie een positief effect heeft op de creativiteit van 
de groep, indien minimaal een lid van de groep relatief introvert is. Introverte 
individuen zijn relatief slecht in staat om meerdere dingen tegelijk te doen 
(multi-tasken) (Lieberman et al., 2001). Multi-tasken is in groepsdiscussies 
nodig: deelnemers moeten tegelijkertijd luisteren naar anderen, zelf ideeën 
ontwikkelen, de bedachte ideeën onthouden en in de gaten houden wanneer 
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zich een gelegenheid voordoet om deze ideeën met de groep te delen. Dit 
multi-tasken is moelijk voor introverte individuen en daarom profiteren met 
name zij van een intermezzo voor stilzwijgend denken waarin ze ongestoord 
ideeën kunnen ontwikkelen. Derhalve levert een intermezzo voor stilzwijgend 
denken een bijdrage aan de creativiteit van de groep, indien er minimaal een 
persoon relatief introvert is. 
De implicaties voor teams zijn duidelijk en gemakkelijk in de praktijk te 
brengen : zet gedurende een groepsdiscussie het gesprek na een tijd stop 
voor een intermezzo voor stilzwijgend denken (bijvoorbeeld 5 minuten), en 
pak direct daarna de draad weer op. Zolang de groep niet louter uit relatief 
extroverte individuen bestaat, verhoogt dit de creativiteit van de groep.
In de studie in hoofdstuk 4, verschuif ik de focus van idee ontwikkeling 
naar idee selectie, op het niveau van de groep. Ik bestudeer het effect van 
stilzwijgend denken (in vergelijking met groepsdebat) op beslissingen, i.c. 
strategische beslissingen: de adoptie van een incrementele of radicale innovatie 
voor introductie op de markt. Groepsdebat en strategische besluitvorming 
zijn beide al veel door wetenschappers bestudeerd, maar niet het effect 
van  eerstgenoemde  op  laatstgenoemde,  in  de  context  van  innovatie.  Ik 
beredeneer, en vind voor deze redenering in deze studie ondersteuning, dat 
groepsdebat (in vergelijking met stilzwijgend denken) de kans verhoogt dat 
een radicale innovatie wordt geselecteerd, echter alleen als de leden van een 
groep relatief goed zijn in het aanpassen van hun zelf-presentatie jegens 
de anderen. Als groepsleden relatief zwak zijn in het aanpassen van hun 
zelf-presentatie, dan verlaagt groepsdebat de kans dat de radicale innovatie 
wordt geselecteerd (ten faveure van de incrementele innovatie). Waarom is 
dit? Het is moeilijker om onder woorden te brengen waarom precies een 
bepaalde radicale innovatie een goed idee is, terwijl het relatief gemakkelijk is 
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om onder woorde ten brengen waarom een bepaalde incrementele innovatie 
te prefereren is. De marktvraag, klantbehoeften, productiekosten, etc. zijn 
namelijk beter bekend voor een incrementele innovatie dan voor een radicale 
innovatie.  Individuen  die  initieel  een  voorkeur  hebben  voor  de  radicale 
innovatie zullen zich in de groep enkel goed staande kunnen houden als 
ze goed in staat zijn hun gedachten goed te presenteren. Anders zal hun 
mening minder zwaar tellen in de discussie dan de mening van diegenen 
die initieel de incrementele innovatie prefereren, en zullen ze het moeilijk 
vinden om stand te houden en zullen ze eerder in staat zijn hun mening 
aan te passen aan de groepsdiscussie die overheerst wordt door argumenten 
voor de incrementele innovatie. Derhalve verhoogt groepsdiscussie de kans 
dat de incrementele innovate wordt geadopteerd als groepsleden relatief 
zwak zijn in het aanpassen van hun zelf-presentatie in de groep. Andersom 
geredeneerd,  verhoogt  groepsdiscussie  de  kans  dat  de  radicale  innovatie 
wordt geadopteerd als groepsleden relatief goed zijn in het aanpassen van 
hun zelf-presentatie.
Samenvattend,  concludeer  ik  uit  deze  drie  studies  dat,  onder  specifieke 
omstandigheden, stilzwijgend denken een positief effect kan hebben op 
creativiteit van het individu en van de groep, en eveneens een effect kan 
hebben op de soort innovatie geselecteerd door een groep.
Dit roept vele interessante vragen op voor verder onderzoek. Ten eerste, is het 
de vraag of het effect van de interactie van het vermogen tot het aanpassen 
van zelf-presentatie en de sensitiviteit voor uitdrukkingen van anderen op 
creativiteit (beschreven in hoofdstuk 2) ook geldt op het niveau van de groep, 
en of het afhangt van de grootte van de groep (aangezien de sensitiviteit 
voor uitdrukkingen van anderen mogelijk een grotere rol speelt als er meer 
personen zijn die zich uitdrukken).
Dissertation_rotis Serif_SW.indd88   88 07.08.2007   9:43:45 Uhr89
Ten  tweede,  wat  betreft  hoofdstuk  3,  zou  het  interessant  zijn  om  te 
onderzoeken wat de effecten zijn van de lengte van en het startmoment (vroeg 
versus laat in de discussie) van het intermezzo voor stilzwijgend denken op 
de creativiteit van de groep. Het zou de externe validiteit versterken indien de 
studie herhaald kan worden met teams van managers in een onderneming.
Ten derde, kan men zich afvragen of het effect van extraversie op het effect 
van het intermezzo op team creativiteit lineair is? Dit vereist een groter aantal 
observaties dan in de studie in hoofdstuk 3. 
Ten vierde, zouden de studies van hoofdstuk 3 en 4 gecombineerd kunnen 
worden in een studie om de vraag te beantwoorden wat het effect van een 
intermezzo voor stilzwijgend denken is op de selectie van radicale versus 
incrementele innovaties.
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